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The Maintenance of Mutual Confidence:
Sentimental Strategies at the Adultery
Trial of Henry Ward Beecher
Laura Hanft Korobkin*
PROLOGUE: CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM
Between July 1874 and July 1875, the most important subject of
discussion in America was New York author and editor Theodore
Tilton's charge that Henry Ward Beecher had committed adultery
with Tilton's wife, Elizabeth. Beecher, the nation's foremost preacher,
was a national symbol of morality, idealism, and self-realization. His
Sunday sermons attracted thousands weekly and were read across the
country by many thousands more. His writings included not only
weekly sermons and essays, but popular volumes of advice to young
men, a life of Jesus, and a best-selling novel, Norwood. Son of an
* I would like to thank Sacvan Bercovitch, Elaine Scarry, Richard Fox, Mary Lou Kete,
Wai-Chee Dimock, Ellen Rooney, and Elizabeth Weed for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this essay. I would also like to thank the Whiting Foundation in New York and the
Pembroke Center for Research and Teaching on Women at Brown University for fellowships
which provided financial support during the writing of this and related work.
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important New England minister, brother of Harriet Beecher Stowe
and Catherine Beecher, Henry Ward Beecher and his family were
considered embodiments of the American spirit: democratic, religious,
energetically moral.'
The scandal about the preacher and Mrs. Tilton had been sim-
mering since November 1872, when free-love advocate Victoria
Woodhull published the accusation in her Woodhull and Claflin's
Weekly, 2 but when Beecher finally authorized his Brooklyn Church
to investigate the charges in July and August of 1874, more than
thirty reporters a day attended the church's hearings. Media preoc-
cupation with the case was said to be unparalleled in journalism.3
1. On Beecher's cultural importance, see generally William G. McLoughlin, The Meaning
of Henry Ward Beecher: An Essay on the Shifting Values of Mid-Victorian America, 1840-1870
(New York: Knopf, 1970); Paul A. Carter, The Spiritual Crisis of the Gilded Age (DeKalb:
Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 1971); Clifford E. Clark, Jr., Henry Ward Beecher: Spokesman for
a Middle-Class America (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1978); Altina L. Waller, Reverend
Beecher and Mrs. Tilton: Sex and Class in Victorian America (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts
Press, 1982). While it is important to this Article to recognize Beecher as a national symbol of
religious virtue, it is not my purpose to analyze his doctrines in detail. It is worth noting,
however, that though historians agree that Beecher was an enormously important moral and
religious figure whose fall triggered a national crisis of confidence in the values he represented,
they disagree sharply about just what those values were. To Clark, Beecher symbolized "the
Victorian cultural ethos." At a time "when industrialization and the growth of cities were
changing the face of the nation, he had reaffirmed the morality of an earlier, more rural
America." C. Clark. 225. People who were "frightened by the rapid and chaotic social change"
had found Beecher reassuring; consequently, if the leading spokesman for Victorian morality was
unmasked as "a fraud and a charlatan, then how could anyone still believe in the cultural system
he espoused?" Ibid., 198. Altina Waller's book-length examination of the case makes Beecher
a champion, not of old-fashioned values, but of "freedom from the rigidity of traditional
institutions-family, church, or town," an advocate of love and "affinity" over obligations to
family, a believer in the value of social mobility and material success, the perfect preacher for
"a congregation of young men whose chances for survival in a changing world required a
geographic, economic, and intellectual departure from the past." Waller, 67, 109. To Waller,
the trial called into question not the morality of an earlier, more rural America, but Beecher's
radical doctrines of emotional "affinity," raising suspicions that Beecher's "Doctrine of Love"
might be the first step down a slippery slope that would end in promiscuous and irreligious
cohabitation.
2. Victoria Woodhull. Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, 2 November 1872.
3. See the description presented in Carter, 115. As the scandal grew in intensity, a number
of quickly published books appeared on the market, reprinting the "documents" in the case and
offering biographies of the people involved. A large number appeared between the time that
Tilton filed his complaint (August 1874) and the time the trial started (January 1875). A
representative sample includes: Charles F. Marshall, The True History of the Brooklyn Scandal:
Being a Complete Account of the Trial of Henry Ward Beecher, of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn,
Upon Charges Proffered by Theodore Tilton, Including All the Original Letters, Documents, and
Private Correspondence with Biographies of the Leading Actors in the Great Drama (Philade-
lphia. Chicago, and St. Louis: National Publishing Co., 1874); Francis P. Williamson, Beecher and
His Accusers: A Complete History of the Great Controversy, Including the Life of Henry Ward
Beecher, together with Pen and Ink sketches of the Persons Prominently Involved, A full record
of all the fact, Leading Comments, Choice Extracts, characteristic anecdotes and Important
Revelations from reliable private sources (Philadelphia: Flint & Co., 1874); The Great Brooklyn
Romance, All the Documents in the Famous Beecher-Tilton Case, Unabridged (New York:
Paxton, 1874); A Class-mate of H. W. Beecher, The Veil Removed; or, Henry Ward Beecher's
Trial and Acquittal Investigated. Love Demonstrated in Plain Dealing. The Congregational
Council Reviewed (New York: n.p., 1874).
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The New York Herald declared in July that "no event since the
murder of Lincoln has so moved the people as this question."4 The
public's obsession with the case became so intense that E. L. Godkin,
editor of The Nation, wrote to James Russell Lowell that he was
escaping to Vermont because the "nastiness of it, and the newspaper
rhetoric on it" had made New York "almost uninhabitable just
now."5  Interest in the case throughout what came to be called
"scandal summer" was much more than local; in a single day in
August, for example, the Chicago Tribune gleefully devoted 22
columns to publishing the Tiltons' marital correspondence, and
articles about the case began to appear regularly in newspapers as far
away as Marseilles and Rome.6 During the second half of 1874, the
New York Times ran 105 stories and 37 editorials about the scandal.
The subsequent civil trial on Tilton's tort charges of criminal
conversation and alienation of affection lasted for more than six
months, from January to July 1875.7 Even after so many months of
4. Quoted in Carter, 114; Milton Rugoff, The Beechers: An American Family in the
Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 493.
5. E. L. Godkin to James Russell Lowell, 30 July 1874, in The Gilded Age Letters of E. L.
Godkin, ed. William Armstrong (New York: SUNY Press, 1974), 212.
6. On July 22, 1874, the Chicago Tribune published five columns on "The Beecher
Explosion." On August 13, in a "major and highly sensational scoop," nearly five pages, twenty-
two full columns, were devoted to the publication of the Tiltons' letters, which were then picked
up and published in the New York papers. Lloyd Wendt, Chicago Tribune: The Rise of a Great
American Newspaper (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979), 248-50. Robert Shaplen reports that "with
the case taking whole pages, national and world news was often reduced to one or two lines."
Robert Shaplen, Free Love and Heavenly Sinners: The Story of the Great Henry Ward Beecher
Scandal (New York: Knopf, 1954), 206-14. Shaplen gives the most complete discussion of media
coverage and popular response to the scandal and trial. He includes detailed descriptions of both
national and international articles, and of the behavior of crowds before and during the trial.
7. Although the name of the common law tort is "criminal conversation," this was a civil,
not a criminal, case. Invented in the last decades of the seventeenth century, criminal
conversation soon replaced the duel as a "civilized" means for a cuckolded husband to obtain
"satisfaction" from his wife's seducer. The suit is for money damages only; no prison term can
result, and the damages are paid directly to the "injured" plaintiff, not as a fine to the
government. The word "criminal" characterizes the sexual "conversation" of wife and lover as
wrongful or sinful, not as a violation of the state's criminal statutes. Lawrence Stone, Road to
Divorce: England 1530-1987 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990), 231-44. The civil status of the
Beecher-Tilton case is important because it framed the case as a commercial dispute over money
between two private men. Legally, the matter concerned no one but Henry Ward Beecher and
Theodore Tilton. In contrast, criminal cases generally image crime as a threat to the order and
security of society as a whole; prosecutions are therefore brought by the ultimate injured
party-the state-rather than by the immediate individual victim. This distinction was, perhaps
understandably, blurred or lost completely in both the forensic and the media discourse
surrounding the scandal and trial. Lawyers linked the verdict to the fate of all civilization, the
future of Christianity, and the ongoing existence of morality. Newspapers focused on the alleged
act of adultery at the heart of the case, and, disregarding legal niceties, described Beecher as
"under the suspicion of a dark crime." The Beecher Trial: A Review of the Evidence. Reprinted
from The New York Times of July 3, 1875, with some Revisions and Additions (New York: The
New York Times, 1875), 33. Even such generally well-informed modern historians as Altina
Waller have mischaracterized the case as criminal. Waller, 11. The law's circumscribed civil story
was simply overpowered by the universal sense that something much larger was profoundly at
stake. Consequently, the national "conversation" about the case was carried on in the broadest
3
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saturation-level publicity, the trial stimulated heightened media
interest. During the trial, every major newspaper in the country
devoted daily front-page coverage to the case, "pushing politics off
the front pages for months at a time."8
In suing the man who had once been his best friend, and who had
performed the marriage ceremony for the Tiltons twenty years earlier,
Tilton had demanded $100,000 damages as compensation for the
injuries to him caused by his wife's alleged adultery with Beecher.9
Neither party nor witness, Elizabeth Tilton nevertheless appeared
daily in the courtroom, a silent, constant presence among the
boisterous spectators. Though the central question in the case was
whether she and Beecher had committed adultery, her legal
"interests" were not technically at issue in the case, and she was
unrepresented by counsel. ° Nevertheless, conversations with her
possible terms.
Beecher was never indicted on criminal charges. In October 1874, before the criminal
conversation trial began, Beecher swore out a criminal complaint which led to indictments
against Tilton and his friend Frank Moulton on criminal charges of malicious libel. When the
criminal conversation case ended inconclusively, Moulton "clamored to be tried" on the libel
charges, knowing that in this case Elizabeth Tilton "would be subpoenaed and both she and the
pastor would be rigorously cross-examined." The suit was dismissed, whereupon Moulton sued
Beecher for malicious prosecution, a charge that was also eventually dismissed. Shaplen, 260;
Marshall, 606-09. In 1872, Victoria Woodhull was briefly imprisoned at the request of morality-
warden Anthony Comstock on federal charges of sending obscene material through the mails,
the "materials" at issue being the Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly article that began the scandal.
Shaplen. 162-64.
8. Wendt, 248.
9. Tilton's complaint alleged, in the verbal formula required for the torts of criminal
conversation and alienation of affection, that Beecher's adultery with his wife had caused the
alienation of her affections from him, by reason of which "the plaintiff has wholly lost the
comfort, society aid and assistance of his said wife," causing "great distress in body and mind
to the damage of the plaintiff one hundred thousand dollars." Tilton versus Beecher, Action for
Crim. Con. (New York: McDivitt and Campbell, 1875), 1:3. (Subsequent transcript references
will be made in the footnotes by reference to volume and page number.) The amount of
damages sought was highly unusual, even for such cases. When it became apparent that the
public was reacting with horror and distaste to the idea that Tilton sought to profit financially
from his wife's disgrace, he withdrew all claims for money damages, declaring that he only
wanted vindication and truth. See, for example, the closing argument for Tilton (III 907),
declaring that he "disdains the idea of touching the gold" of Beecher and wants only the
impartial hearing he could not get from Beecher's church council.
10. Although Elizabeth Tilton's reputation and future life were very much at stake, she was
not a party to the litigation. A verdict for Tilton would not have rendered her liable to pay
damages, nor would it have served as a legally binding judgment or finding against her in any
related litigation, such as a criminal adultery prosecution. The case was carried on solely
between the two men; it is in this sense that her "interests" were not involved. In addition, the
long-standing ban on spouses testifying for or against each other in any litigation disqualified
her from appearing as a witness. Simon Greenleaf justified the ban on public policy grounds in
his Treatise on the Law of Evidence, declaring:
It is essential to the happiness of social life that the confidence subsisting between husband
and wife should be sacredly protected and cherished in its most unlimited extent; and to
break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of that relation
would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.
Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (Boston: Little Brown, 1854), Sec. 334-5,
495-6. On this topic, see also William Bowdesley Best, Principles of the Law of Evidence; With
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were recounted from the witness stand, her intimate letters to her
husband were read in the public courtroom, and she was continually
described and assessed by counsel for both sides."
Popular involvement in the trial was intense. Huge crowds surged
around the courthouse. Hopefuls waited all night for a chance to get
a ticket for one of the limited spectator seats inside the courtroom,
while "as many as three thousand persons a day were turned away,
affording near-by saloons a booming business."' 2 Scalpers sold the
free tickets for as much as five dollars each. Immense bouquets of
flowers were delivered to Beecher and to Tilton where they sat with
counsel, until the courtroom reeked of the odors of hothouse plants
and the competition by each party's supporters to produce ever more
magnificent and showy bouquets thoroughly upstaged the ongoing
interrogation of witnesses on the stand. 3 Jurors and spectators
Elementary Rules for Conducting the Examination and Cross-examination of Witnesses (Albany:
Weare C. Little, 1875), Sec. 127. Yet even Beecher's attorneys called Elizabeth "the true
defendant in the cause-she whose lips are sealed and whose hands are tied, while the battle is
waging over her body" (II 9). For strategic reasons, Tilton offered to waive the spousal privilege
if his wife wished to testify for Beecher. As he no doubt expected, however, the trial judge
refused the offer of waiver (III 313-14).
The enforced silence of Elizabeth Tilton was one of the structural preconditions for the trial's
uncircumscribed production of testimonial and argumentative fictions. While this Article does
not take up the "absent presence" of Elizabeth Tilton in detail, several recent works have
focused on her place in the scandal and the trial. On the forensic construction of Elizabeth
Tilton as a character of fiction, and the use of Charles Reade's 1866 bestseller Griffith Gaunt
to interpret Elizabeth Tilton to the jury, see Laura Hanft Korobkin, "Silent Woman, Speaking
Fiction: Griffith Gaunt at the Trial of Henry Ward Beecher," in The New Nineteenth Century:
Feminist Readings of Underread Victorian Texts. Wellesley Studies in Critical Theory, Literary
History, and Culture, ed. Barbara Harman and Susan Meyer (New York: Garland Publishing,
forthcoming). For a sympathetic and perceptive investigation of what the relationship with
Beecher might have meant to Elizabeth Tilton, see Richard Wightman Fox, "Intimacy on Trial:
Cultural Meanings of the Beecher-Tilton Affair." in The Power of Culture: Critical Essays in
American History, ed. Richard Wightman Fox (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993), 103-32.
For a psychological reading of Elizabeth Tilton's sexuality and her place in the scandal, see
Waller, 54-63.
11. See, for example, testimony of Theodore Tilton, II 391, 396-98 (recitation of Mrs.
Tilton's "confessions of guilt to her husband"); II 402 (Beecher told Tilton that "their sexual
commerce had been through love and not through lust"); II 443 (Beecher never denied the
"criminal intercourse" with Elizabeth, but insisted that he should be blamed for it); II 454-57
(series of questions to Tilton about Elizabeth's character, "pride in woman's chastity," reading
habits, religious opinions, "the delicacy of her behavior toward the other sex," whether she was
"of a sympathetic and affectionate nature"). During the opening and closing arguments, lawyers
for both sides commented freely on her "middle age" and "gray hairs" (Il 649, III 826).
Beecher's lawyers characterized her as a "child," an "unhappy little woman" engaged in a
"violent and protracted struggle between her passion and her sense of duty, which had destroyed
her health and unsettled her reason" (II 49, 48). Tilton's attorneys refused to agree that she had
"an exalted and perfect character" (111 887), stressing instead her "shame and infamy," her
"weakness" and her "fall" (III 889-92).
12. Shaplen, 216.
13. For descriptions of the carnival atmosphere of the trial, see the daily reporter's
commentaries in the transcript, especially day 19 ("a stranger might have thought himself in a
place of amusement") (I 459); Shaplen, 216; Milton Rugoff, America's Gilded Age: Intimate
Portraits from an Era of Extravagance and Change 1850-1890 (New York: Henry Holt, 1989),
207-08. In "An Afternoon at the Beecher Trial," an Overland Monthly reporter describes the
5
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fainted in the June heat wave and were carried out of the courtroom.
Trial transcripts, printed daily in several New York newspapers, were
also sold to the public in booklet form as the trial continued. 4
Final arguments to the jury lasted sixteen full days. On July 2, the
112th day of trial, after eight days of deliberation and fifty-two ballots,
the jury announced that they were deadlocked. "It is a question of
fact, a question of the veracity of witnesses on which we do not agree,
your Honor, and I would say I think there is not a possibility of an
agreement in this jury," explained Chester Carpenter, the jury's
foreman. Judge Neilson reluctantly dismissed the jurors, and the case
ended without a verdict. 5 When Beecher entered Plymouth Church
that evening for his weekly prayer meeting, a crowd on the sidewalk
cheered, while inside devoted parishioners sobbed.'6
In the following days and weeks, the media delivered a variety of
verdicts. Harper's Weekly, Scribner's Monthly, and many others
stoutly insisted that the nonverdict was tantamount to an acquittal,
assuring their readers that "the majority of the jury in the late trial,
like the majority of the public, held Mr. Beecher guiltless of the crime
charged against him, and the result of the trial is virtual acquittal."' 7
Many others were not so forgiving. In the Nation, Godkin
editorialized: "It can hardly be said that this is a victory for anybody,
but it is something very like a defeat for Mr. Beecher." Whether
Beecher was innocent or guilty of the charge, Godkin declared, "It is
a pitiful story, which must remain a permanent blot on his reputation,
and must considerably diminish if not destroy his influence as a moral
teacher."'" In a lengthy assessment of the evidence three days after
the trial's conclusion, the New York Times concluded that the facts
"tell heavily against Mr. Beecher," something that "will be universally
trial as a "matinee" and "reviews" it as drama. "An Afternoon at the Beecher Trial," Overland
Monthly, August 1875, 182-94. Samuel Leland Powers provides a charming description of both
the trial and Beecher's Sunday sermons during the trial from the point of view of a very young
lawyer. Samuel Leland Powers, Portraits of a Half Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1925). On the
delivery of floral arrangements, see Walter Earle, Shearman and Sterling 1873-1973 (New York:
n.p., 1973). 117-19. E. L. Godkin, who was disgusted by the scandal and considered Beecher a
fraud, likened the flowers in the courtroom to "wreaths round the man-hole of a sewer."
Quoted in C. Clark, 227. On the scalping of tickets, see the Overland Monthly article and
Rugoff, The Beechers, 496.
14. Complete trial transcripts were published daily in several New York newspapers,
including the New York Tribune. The Tribune's reporter became an important functionary in
the courtroom; Judge Neilson occasionally asked him to read back earlier testimony. I 71. The
Tribune's daily transcripts became the basis for McDivitt and Campbell's three-volume edition
of the trial. See also advertisements for the "Pictorial History of the Beecher-Tilton trial" for
sale "at all news depots price 30 cents," and classified ads for "agents wanted for the True
History of the Brooklyn Scandal," in Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper.
15. III 1041-42.
16. Shaplen, 255.
17. C. Clark, 224-25.
18. Editorial, The Nation, 8 July 1875, 22-23.
[Vol. 7: 1
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regretted, for it is a mournful sight to see a great preacher of religion
resting even under the suspicion of a dark crime."' 9 Newspapers
from Kentucky to London were more blunt, calling Beecher "a
dunghill covered with flowers" and asserting that he had "acted with
an imbecility that would have disgraced an uneducated girl."9
20
In the following year, Plymouth Church voted Beecher an ad-
ditional $100,000 salary to cover his legal expenses; sent copies of the
final arguments in his defense to "every library, college, and impor-
tant church in the country"; and convened a second Church Council
which again acquitted Beecher of all charges. 2' Beecher continued
to be a popular preacher and lecturer, and some historians assert that
he recovered his position and the faith of his followers, 22 while
others conclude that he was taken less seriously as a religious leader,
that he became a butt of mockery even in the religious press, and that
"his lectures were often frequented by curiosity seekers rather than
admiring parishioners."'  The Tiltons separated but never divorced.
Theodore Tilton's professional career was ruined by the scandal; he
eventually "fled to Paris where he lived in poverty, writing poetry and
playing chess., 24  Elizabeth Tilton was supported for a time by
members of Beecher's congregation, who hired her as a tutor. When
she issued an unambiguous admission of the affair in 1878, however,
she was swiftly excommunicated. 25 As Altina Waller concludes, "she
grew old in Brooklyn, a virtual outcast, sustained only by the devotion
of her daughter and a small radical group known as the Christian
Friends., 26  Gradually, the scandal that "cast a stain upon the fair
name of the Great Republic of the West," and the trial that counsel
had confidently declared would "loom larger in history than any
which has taken place for eighteen centuries" were forgotten.
27
19. The Beecher Trial: A Review of the Evidence, 33.
20. Louisville Courier Journal, London Daily Telegraph, quoted in Shaplen, 258.
21. Paxton Hibben, Henry Ward Beecher: An American Portrait (New York: Doran. 1927),
282.
22. C. Clark, 224-29.
23. Waller, 146; Rugoff. The Beechers, 499-501.
24. Waller, 11; Rugoff, America's Gilded Age, 210.
25. In a public letter to her legal advisor, reprinted in most major American newspapers,
Elizabeth said, "after long months of mental anguish, I told ... a few friends whom I had
bitterly deceived that the charge brought by my husband, of adultery between myself and the
Reverend Henry Ward Beecher was true, and that the lie I had lived so well the last four years
had become intolerable to me. That statement I now solemnly re-affirm, and leave the truth to
God, to whom I also commit myself, my children, and all who must suffer .... " Even three
years after the trial, the New York Times devoted four columns on page one to the story of Mrs.
Tilton's letter, Beecher's denials, and the comments of family, friends, and lawyers. New York
Times, 16 April 1878, 1. As Rugoff notes, "[It was the only statement she had ever made
without pressure, and it has the ring of truth; but it came too late." Rugoff, America's Gilded
Age, 210.
26. Waller, 145; Shaplen, 272.
27. Marshall, 13; I 92.
1995]
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Though the immediacy of the Beecher-Tilton scandal has long since
faded, its year-long reign as a national obsession invites analysis. In
a decade filled with scandals about the vices and corruption of public
figures like Grant and Tweed, what about this one led newspaper-
reading Americans to experience it as the most significant event since
the death of Lincoln? This Article argues that one important
explanation for the case's spectacular notoriety is that both the
months of adversarial interrogation and the concentration of interest
on the single issue of credibility played into a profound pre-existing
cultural anxiety about the difficulty of distinguishing sincerity from
hypocrisy. What Paul Carter has called the "obsessive, even
compulsive quality" of the nation's involvement in the case becomes
more understandable if we think of the trial as a convergence of
structure, substance, and national concern about the difficulty of
making reliable judgments about other people. Transformed from
titillating, gossipy newspaper stories into a formal public trial which
became an increasingly undecidable interrogation of hypocrisy, the
trial touched one of the country's rawest nerves. Following each day's
testimony in their newspapers, Americans saw both a beloved figure
and longstanding role model, and the reliability of their own methods
of judgment on trial.28
With this cultural context in mind, I will concentrate on the
rhetorical strategies deployed by the lawyers in the courtroom,
focusing on the forensic use of sentimentality to "solve" the case's
central credibility problems and on the contemporary critique of such
tactics of jury persuasion. I will also suggest broader connections
28. The Beecher scandal has received a substantial amount of critical attention. Though
reaching sharply different assessments of the famous preacher's personal virtue, biographers such
as Clifford Clark, McLoughlin, and Hibben see the scandal as critical evidence for the project
of understanding the Gilded Age through its most "representative" figure. The introduction to
Paxton Hibben's 1927 biography associates Beecher's significance with his representative
capacity: he is "a prodigious figure not by blazing a path in any wilderness, but by the fact that
his inner experience was identical with that of millions of his fellow countrymen." Hibben. xiv.
Clark's biography, titled Henry Ward Beecher: Spokesman for a Middle-Class America, attributes
Beecher's popularity to his having "articulated the attitudes and values of a new urban middle
class that emerged at mid-century," while his life "provides new insight into the relationship
between religion and Victorian culture in America during the crucial middle decades of the
nineteenth century." C. Clark, 3-4. Social historians, reading the scandal through such situating
specifics as the demographics of membership in Beecher's church, the political affiliations of his
attorneys, and the editorial slants of the media coverage, argue that it elicited widespread
expressions of anxiety about spirituality (Carter), intimacy (Fox, "Intimacy on Trial"), and
political and religious rivalries between different denominations and political parties (Waller).
Significantly, none of these major studies analyzes the trial or its rhetoric closely. There are two
notable exceptions to this communal dismissal of the trial as subject: Carlson and Douglas.
Carlson's article uses Ann Douglas's "feminization" thesis to analyze Beecher's defense strategy.
Cheree Carlson, "The Role of Character in Public Moral Argument: Henry Ward Beecher and
the Brooklyn Scandal," Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (1991): 38-52. Douglas considers the trial
briefly and disdainfully, mocking Elizabeth Tilton's intimacy with Beecher rather than analyzing
it. Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New York: Knopf, 1988).
[Vol. 7: 1
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between legal process, literary form, and the historical concerns of
culture. Sentimentality's pervasive deployment at an important trial
in 1875 tells us a great deal, not just about which literary forms
enjoyed popularity during the period, but about the particular
anxieties and concerns animating American culture at the time. Yet
the "truth" of sentimentality in 1875 was anything but unquestioned.
While its use at the Beecher-Tilton trial suggests its continuing power,
the trial record also reflects continual attacks on sentimentality as
artificial and unpersuasive.2 9 What makes the Beecher-Tilton trial's
million-word transcript an extraordinary site for cultural analysis is the
way that it freeze-frames, through its seemingly endless textualized
rhetoric, a moment of intense cultural dynamism. Through it we can
glimpse the "sentimental synthesis," which had been so splendidly
transparent before the Civil War, still exerting a surprising rhetorical
dominance even as it jousts uneasily with an antisentimental backlash
and an often unstated acceptance of modernist discontinuities.
Section I of this Article sets out the basic assumptions about the
literary "narrativity" of trial process that underlie my analysis.
Sections II and III use a reading of William Maxwell Evarts's closing
argument for Henry Ward Beecher to compare Evarts's rhetorical
strategy to sentimental strategies employed by such authors of fiction
as Beecher's sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe. In addition to literary
sentimentality, I connect Evarts's forensic rhetoric to theories of
credibility and "mutual confidence" advanced by nineteenth-century
evidence theorists such as William Mowdesley Best and by recent
cultural critics such as Karen Halttunen. Section IV examines the
era's powerful antisentimentalist critique. After a brief discussion of
Tilton's inconsistent challenge to Beecher's sentimental strategy, I
29. While lawyers for both sides indulged in melodramatic, sentimentalized rhetoric without
fear of mockery, readings from certain letters and documents elicited vociferous amusement in
the courtroom, which the lawyers often exploited. In his summing up for Beecher, for instance,
Mr. Porter's reading of "supposed expressions" from the Tiltons' marital correspondence was
reported as having "stirred up a breeze of merriment in the audience" (III 557). In an editorial
on the case before the trial started, The Nation issued a "Lesson for Sentimentalists," warning
that the "letters, 'statements,' 'confessions,' and other documents of the parties to the affair"
exhibited a use of sentimental language that
seems almost to lose the character of an instrument for the expression of definite
propositions-or, in other words, for the communication by one human being to another
of formulated thought-and becomes a mere mode of indicating certain states of feeling,
like the noises made by the lower animals. On reading their compositions, one has to guess
at what they really mean, the only thing certain being that they are either happy or
miserable, just as when a dog howls or barks we know that he is either glad or sorry or
angry, but cannot well make out what he would have us do. They resemble lower animals
too, very strikingly in the absence from their minds of all gradations of feeling, and of all
reserve in their intercourse with each other. They seem to have no more power of pursuing
a middle course, of making distinctions and allowances, of adapting their expression to cir-
cumstances, than our humble friends of the kennel and stable.
3 September 1874, 150.
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focus on Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner's 1873 novel, The
Gilded Age, which features a climactic murder trial at which the
emotionally seductive rhetoric of an Evarts-like lawyer destroys the
jury's rational decision-making capacity. Finally, in the Epilogue I
discuss the contrast in literary form between individual trial narratives
and the inclusive novel-like transcript of an entire trial or lawsuit.
I. THE TRIAL AS SUBJEcT: LITERARY FORM AND LITIGATIVE
STRATEGY
In speaking of the "narrativity" of courtroom testimony and
argument, and in analyzing courtroom speaking in literary terms such
as genre, plot, character, and rhetoric, I am making what has become
a basic assumption about the way that legal process works: all
litigation is essentially conducted by constructing, presenting, and
interpreting narrative versions of past events.3" From the filing of
the legal complaint that initiates a lawsuit, through the taking of
depositions, to the testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel
at trial, to the verdict itself, and through every phase of the appeal,
litigants, lawyers, and judges are engaged in a constant process of
narrative shaping and presentation. To win a case, a litigant must
transform the complex and ambiguous data of subjective experience
into a persuasive narrative. Not only must that narrative be coherent,
consistent, and believable, but it must be unambiguously moral, must
demonstrate the litigant's entitlement to win (or to defeat) the case.
If litigants and their attorneys are thus continually engaged in
writing and telling stories, they do so for practical rather than literary
reasons. Significantly, the instrumental importance of such litigative
narratives puts their intended readers in a uniquely powerful position.
The "finder of fact," whether judge or jury, delivers the story-ending
30. There is a lively critical literature on "storytelling in the courtroom." Examples include
W. Lance Bennet and Martha Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and
Judgment in American Culture (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1981); Robert Hariman,
ed., Popular Trials: Rhetoric, Mass Media and the Law (Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press,
1990); Janice Schuetz and Kathryn Holmes Snedaker, Communication and Litigation: Case
Studies of Famous Trials (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1988), which all present
detailed analysis of the production of stories in litigative settings. Bernard Jackson's semiotic
analyses have argued with great sophistication that fact construction within legal process is
always narrative creation, that the laws governing such creation have a narrative origin, and that
legal reasoning is not so much a question of logic and syllogisms as of similarities and differences
between stories. Bernard Jackson, Law, Fact, and Narrative Coherence, (London: D. Charles
Publications, 1988); Bernard Jackson, "Narrative Theories and Legal Discourse," in Narrative
in Culture: The Uses of Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy and Literature, ed. Christopher
Nash (New York: Routledge, 1990). In the field of sociology, Pennington and Hastie have used
interviews with juries during and after trials to construct complex and persuasive models of the
storytelling process through which jurors "impose a narrative organization on evidence." Nancy
Pennington and Reid Hastie, "A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model,"
Cardozo Law Review 13 (1991): 519, 523.
[Vol. 7: 1
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verdict that metes out rewards and punishments consistent with the
factfinder's determination of "the story thus far."3  From the
plaintiff's or defendant's point of view, the storytelling "succeeds"
only if it convinces the jury-audience. Because courtroom storytelling
is thus profoundly contingent on the response it produces, courtroom
storytellers inevitably try to minimize uncertainty by shaping the story
to elicit a predictable, sympathetic response. Witnesses and counsel
frame their stories for maximal appeal to the specific audience of
judge or jury, using what they know or infer about jurors' and judges'
values, education, and literary familiarity. The particular story told,
and the way it is told, represents the teller's best guess about what
will persuade the specific audience for whom it is constructed. If the
jury can be thought of as "writing" the stories that it hears, those
stories are also, importantly, told to "steer" the jury toward a desired
interpretation.
My emphasis on the central role of the juror-reader in litigative
storytelling has obvious analogies to the work of literary critics who
put the reader's interaction with the text at the center of their inves-
tigations.32  Response-centered criticism has long argued that
meaning is a product of the reader's interpretive activity rather than
a function of the text itself. Readers do not approach texts with
minds empty of preconceptions; rather, the text must "be thought of
as an utterance that has meaning only with respect to a system of
conventions which the reader has assimilated."33 These systems of
31. The jury's verdict, while it provides a formal moment of closure at the end of the trial,
may well not be the last narrative in the case. On appeal, a new set of oppositional stories will
be told. narratives that will include the "story" of the trial and the alleged errors that were
committed there. One or more appeals court decisions will supply additional narrative framings
of the case, each with a different emphasis. It is worth noting, however, that because the jury
is officially denominated the "finder of fact." questions about the events antecedent to the trial
that have been settled by the rendering of the verdict are not technically open on appeal. This
gives the jury a special authoring power within the realm of fact. As Kim Lane Scheppele has
persuasively argued, however, the distinction between fact and law is often more apparent than
real, as fact and law are "mutually constituting-not simply hard to tell apart." Kim Lane
Scheppele, "Finding Facts in Legal Interpretation," in Law and the Order of Culture, ed. Robert
Post (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1991), 62.
32. The best introduction to response-centered criticism is still the collection of essays edited
by Jane Tompkins. Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1980). Another major work in the field is
Stanley Fish's Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980). Fish's more recent work, collected in Doing What'
Comes Naturally: Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham:
Duke Univ. Press, 1989) brings his approaches to texts into the legal arena. Fish engages with
explicitly "legal" texts such as appellate court decisions and rules of evidence, but he does not
investigate the narrativity inherent in litigation or the production of stories by lawyers and
witnesses at trial.
33. Jonathan Culler, "Literary Competence," in Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism
to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1980), 104.
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rules and assumptions derive in large part from the reader's wealth of
prior experience as a reader, that is, the remembered responses the
reader has had in the past to similar plots, characters, and language.
A reader who has read widely will be able to identify a text from its
opening chapter as an epic or a tragedy based on a range of familiar
linguistic identifiers such as tone, voice, vocabulary, or event. 4 She
will consequently have specific expectations about how the story will
"turn out," about which characters are to be admired and identified
with, which recoiled from with horror. Many of the textual clues that
shape a reader's response are linked to aspects of literary genre; once
she knows what kind of story she is reading, tragedy or farce, hard-
boiled detective fiction or soft-core pornography, she has a set of
interpretive rules that she can apply with confidence. Different
genres represent similar events* differently;" thus, to predict how a
particular reader will interpret a story about murder, it would be
helpful to know whether the story was told in a manner more similar
to Crime and Punishment or to the recent film comedy So I Married
an Axe Murderer.
While any number of "law and literature" scholars have declared
that legal process works through storytelling, they have only recently
begun to pay attention to the kinds of stories told in courtrooms. As
Robert Ferguson recently demonstrated in a brilliant study of John
Brown's successful self-construction at his murder trial as a "hero of
Romance": "we can only tell the stories we know how to tell, and the
degree of our understanding-our appreciation-depends on issues of
narrative and genre often present but usually missed in studies of the
legal process."36 In framing their cases for the jury as stories that
34. Readers who come to texts without experience reading similar works will still be able
interpret and understand them, of course, and will make a host of inferences about what will
happen and what to expect based on textual "clues." Even when the genre or approach is quite
new to us, however, we come to the text with a wealth of both general and specific interpretive
strategies based, in the broadest sense, on our prior experience as readers.
35. This is not to imply that all stories fit neatly into pre-existing genres, or that, once
labeled, they will inevitably follow predictable patterns. Much of the pleasure of reading
literature involves being surprised by the unexpected. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin:
The Reader in Paradise Lost, (London: Macmillan, 1967). Wolfgang Iser argues that
"expectations are scarcely ever fulfilled in truly literary texts," because the confirmation of
expectations suggests a didactic purpose and "[re]ore often than not, the very clarity of such
texts will make us want to free ourselves from their clutches." The Implied Reader: Patterns in
Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
1974), 277. In genres such as melodrama, romance, and sentimentality, however, readers often
report that their greatest enjoyment is tied to the security of their discursive expectations, their
confidence that the rules will be followed in a satisfying way. See Janice A. Radway, Reading
the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Literature (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina
Press, 1984).
36. See, e.g. Robert A. Ferguson, "Story and Transcription in the Trial of John Brown," Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities 6 (1994): 37-73. Ferguson is one of a small group who have
looked closely at issues of genre in litigative storytelling. Others include Susan Staves, whose
work on eighteenth-century criminal conversation cases reads them as specific contests of
[Vol. 7: 1
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they "know how to tell," lawyers inevitably, and often unconsciously,
draw on the story-forms most familiar and powerful within the culture
at the time. They do so, moreover, not just to make their clients'
claims neatly coherent and thus "tellable," but to evoke the specific
and predictable responses that jurors will have already learned to
make as readers to stock characters and situations in fain liar
romances, farces, or sentimental tragedies. By suggesting that the
facts of a case constitute a story much like others that jurors
know-especially if the analogous stories offer unambiguous moral
assessments of character and action-a lawyer can provide jurors with
a clear moral framework to use as a guide in making credibility
determinations and evidentiary assessments.
A literary mode such as sentimentality-which dominated the
Beecher-Tilton trial-can make this task seem easier. Nineteenth-
century American sentimental fiction tended to divide the world into
the morally unambiguous categories of victim and perpetrator, while
its textual strategies aimed to induce an identification with the
deserving but abused victim, prototypically a child, slave, or or-
phan.37  If the victim-hero/ne suffered at the hands of oppressive
interpretation in which the defendants attempted to construct the case as a tragedy while the
plaintiff framed it as farce; Claire Dalton, whose deconstruction of contract doctrine includes a
revealing study of the gendered literary stereotypes that underlie judicial characterizations of
parties; Edward Berenson, whose study of a 1914 French murder case contextualized defense
strategy through a study of cultural stereotypes and narratives about women; Daniel Cohen, who
reads an 1845 New England murder case through literary stereotypes and narratives of women
as seductresses and victims: and Michael Grossberg, whose recent analysis of an antebellum
custody case takes up issues of literary characterization of the parties. Susan Staves, "Money
for Honor: Damages for Criminal Conversation," Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 11
(1982): 279-97; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine," Yale Law
Journal 94 (1985): 997-1221; Edward Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1992). The work of most other "law and story" critics,
though often extremely useful, tends to treat the category of "story" as if it were a unitary genre,
essentialist and transhistorical. A recent Michigan Law Review symposium on legal storytelling
held in August 1989 is typical. It contains useful articles on such topics as the humanizing
impact of stories about the oppression, victimization, and brutalization of "outgroups" (De-
lgado), the "competing versions of a story" that become "an important feature of the dispute
at hand" (Scheppele); and the stories that lawyers "translate" into meaningful forensic shape for
their clients (Cunningham). Richard Delgado, "Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative," Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 2411-41: Kim Lane Scheppele. "Foreword:
Telling Stories," Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 2073-98: Clark D. Cunningham, "A Tale of
Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language," Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 2459-94. Yet
none of these investigations take into account the enormous wealth of familiar-and significantly
diverging-story-forms that must inform any lawyer's or jury's "narrativization" of the evidence
at trial.
37. The best introductions to American literary sentimentality are Jane Tompkins,
Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860 (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1985); Shirley Samuels, ed., The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender and Sentimen-
tality in Nineteenth-Century America (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992); Philip Fisher, "Making
a Thing Into a Man: The Sentimental Novel and Slavery," in Hard Facts: Setting and Form in
the American Novel (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987). Fisher argues that in the case of
"prisoners, children, animals and slaves-the weak and the helpless within society gain by means
of sentimental experience full representation through the central moral category of compassion."
13
Korobkin: The Maintenance of Mutual Confidence: Sentimental Strategies at the Adultery Trial of Henry Ward Beecher
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1995
14 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 7: 1
masters, teachers, or relatives, the familiar "trials and tribulations"
plot pattern ensured that in the final chapter virtue would be
rewarded and vice punished."8 By suggesting to the jury that the
"story" of the Beecher-Tilton case could be read as a familiar
sentimental narrative, lawyers invited juror-readers to assign the trial's
"characters" to clearly demarcated categories of virtue and vice, to
conform complex and ambiguous fact constellations to paradigmatic
plots of unjust treatment, and to view their own verdict as an
"authorial" opportunity to mete out rewards and punishments,
producing an appropriately happy ending. Such literary surrogacy
becomes a shortcut through the painstaking and difficult process of
evidentiary evaluation: having accepted a proffered story formulation,
jurors know how to assess each piece of evidence and resolve each
testimonial conflict. The story assumes a kind of primacy, deter-
mining rather than reflecting the answers to questions about what
happened or which party has the better legal claim. Especially in a
lengthy, confusing trial such as Beecher's, the interpretive certainty of
sentimental story logic can do more than simply guide evidentiary
assessment: it can supplant it. This means that the party who supplies
the most persuasive story formulation of the case's facts has gone a
long way towards winning the case. It is not surprising, therefore,
that many of the bitterest courtroom conflicts are, at bottom, about
which party will control the story framework through which the jury
"reads" the case.39 It is not necessary, of course, that opposing
Fisher, 94-95. On sentimentality's resistance to "humanizing" its villains, see Fisher, 116-17.
38. In the gallery of classic sentimental victims, many ultimately succeed in worldly terms,
winning marriage, money and, presumably, personal salvation. These include Ellen Montgomery
in Susan Warner's The Wide Wide World (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1851), Gertie in Maria
Cummins's The Lamplighter (Boston: J. P. Jewett and Co., 1854), and Ishmael Worth in Emma
D.E.N. Southworth's Ishmael; or In the Depths (Philadelphia: T. B. Peterson, 1876), as well as
some who succeed by going to heaven, like Little Eva in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's
Cabin, or Life Among the Lowly (Boston: J.P. Jewett and Co., 1852). The unrelieved and
unavenged sufferings of such characters as Dickens's Jo (Charles Dickens, Bleak House
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1853)) and Smike (Charles Dickens. Life and Adventures of
Nicholas Nickleby (London: Chapman and Hall, 1839)), or Stowe's Prue (Uncle Tom's Cabin),
which are not "solved" within the confines of the story, are consistent with the sentimental,
reader-centered strategy since, if their pain is effective, it will elicit in readers a determination
to relieve such suffering wherever they encounter it in the world.
39. In their recent analysis of the courtroom and media narrativization of the first Rodney
King beating trial and the 1992 Los Angeles riots, Kimberl6 Crenshaw and Gary Peller use this
approach effectively, describing the battle for narrative control at the trial as a larger ideological
struggle that would determine the meaning of race in the trial context. "This very struggle over
meaning is precisely what the intense contestations about race in the law are really about," they
argue. Kimberle Crenshaw and Gary Pellet, "Reel Time/Real Justice," in Reading Rodney
King/Reading Urban Uprising, ed. Robert Gooding-Williams (New York: Routledge, 1993), 64.
They identify a defense strategy of "disaggregation," a "narrative technique that narrows the
perception of the range of illegitimate racial power by divorcing particular episodes from their
larger social contrast," and compare it to a "counternarrative" of insurrection that "implies a
focus on the power relations and dynamics that exist between the 'rioters' and the 'police',"
conceiving of the uprising "as a communal response to a much larger set of issues of social
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parties conveniently champion different literary modes; at the
Beecher-Tilton trial both sides exploited sentimentality's emotional
powers when it suited them to do so, and both sides mocked
sentimentality when such mockery seemed expedient.'
A brief example will illustrate how this process of sentimental nar-
rativizing worked at the Beecher-Tilton trial. As plaintiff's counsel,
Theodore Tilton's attorneys made their opening statement to the jury
before the first witness was sworn, giving them a powerful opportunity
to preempt the storymaking field by controlling each juror's initial
assignment of the roles of hero and villain to one or the other of the
parties." After a lengthy recitation of the wrongs to which Tilton
had been subjected by Beecher, Samuel D. Morris ended the first day
of his opening statement for Theodore Tilton by telling the jury: "We
come here from a blighted and a desolated home. The children of my
client are scattered in different parts. He will return to-night to as
cold, as cheerless, and as desolate a home as there is in the land.
And from that voiceless home and cheerless fireside he will come in
the morning, to meet you, fathers, and brothers, and husbands, you
coming from your happy homes, he from his desolate one."'42 Even
this fragment of Morris's rhetoric, which is consistent with his tone
and vocabulary throughout the three days of his opening, reveals a
great deal. First, it shows how Morris effectively exploits the familiar
sentimental tropes of splintered family, cheerless fireside, and
suffering father/brother/husband, in order to demonstrate that it is
Tilton, not Beecher, who should occupy the space of sympathetic
victim-hero in the jurors' minds. Morris wants to elicit from juror-
readers the kind of pity and compassion for a deeply wronged (but
deserving and compensable) hero that they had learned to feel by
reading sentimental fiction and, as a practical matter, to plant that
power." Ibid., 68.
40. In his closing for Beecher, for instance, Porter dealt with the highly sentimentalized
language of a letter of Elizabeth Tilton's both affirmatively and defensively. First, he exploited
sentimentality as a guarantor of sincerity and a tool for making determinations of credibility
when he noted that the letter was written "by the side of the cradle and on the evening of the
Sabbath day" by a "mother loyal to her husband" (III 576). Then, in an attempt to co-opt the
sneering response such letters had elicited, he blamed their availability on Theodore Tilton, who
betrayed his wife by "sending forth this letter to the world to encounter the scoffs and the
derision of those who despise sentimentalism" (III 576). Earlier, he had invited the jurors to
blame the letters' artificiality on Theodore Tilton: "You marvel at the sentimental form of the
letters of Mrs. Tilton. Now bear in mind, gentlemen, she had an excuse, this man required it.
It was he that dictated how her letters were to be written" (III 573). This doubleness of
attitude, both accepting and mocking the emotional intensity of sentimental rhetoric, especially
in letters, ran throughout the trial.
41. Beecher's counsel made a delayed opening statement beginning on the thirty-seventh day
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characterization firmly enough so that the coming months of
testimony will be filtered through it.
Second, Morris sets up a narrative opposition which is not, as one
might expect, between plaintiff and defendant, but between plaintiff
and juror. By positioning the jurors as the possessors of successful,
family-defined identities (fathers and brothers and husbands), and
superior domestic comforts (your happy homes), Morris encourages
them to look down on Tilton in pity for having undeservedly lost what
they are imaged as enjoying: a happy home and family. At the same
time, however, he also implies that no family happiness is proof
against a home-wrecker like Beecher, whose "crimes" threaten
everyone's security, including the jurors'. Morris drives the point
home two days later by assuring the jury that when they have
rendered the verdict that would "brand the seducer as his crime
deserves to be branded," they would "receive the prayers and
blessings of every virtuous mother and of every virtuous daughter in
the land, and a peaceful conscience will follow you through life, will
be with you in the last solemn scenes on earth, and console you when
at last you stand with your life-record before the ever-living God."43
As a reward for reestablishing justice and virtue in the world through
their verdict, the jurors will earn, in their own lives, the gratitude of
others, a guilt-free conscience, and an easy passage at the Last
Judgment. Morris's rhetoric employs senti-mentality at its most
powerful: not only does he use sentimental stereotypes to shape the
jurors' reception of the upcoming evidence, but he also makes each
juror's personal life a part of what is at stake in the trial. His forensic
sentimentality constructs the reader as it constructs its own text.
II. THE FEAR OF FALSE FICTIONS: CONVERGENCES OF TRIAL
STRUCTURE, CASE CONTENT, AND CULTURAL CONCERN
If the level of attention accorded the Beecher-Tilton scandal by the
media and the American public gave it national importance, its
crystallization into adversarial litigation transformed it, in the minds
of many, into a matter of world-historical significance. "This is no
contest between litigants to determine the right of property," asserted
Morris to resounding applause as he began his opening statement for
Theodore Tilton. "It is a trial the consequences of which reach to the
very foundations of society. The home, the marriage relation with all
that is dear in that relation, is upon trial in this case. Upon the result
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of the Christian religion."'  To understand how millions of news-
paper-reading "jurors" came to believe that their deepest personal,
cultural, and religious values were somehow at stake in Judge
Neilson's Brooklyn courtroom, we need to find a connection between
the structure of trial process, the substantive issues raised by this
particular trial, and a pervasive concern of Americans at the time.45
That connection is the problem of hypocrisy.
All litigation simultaneously generates and undermines every
witness's testimonial narrative. The problem of testimonial hypocrisy
is thus built into the structural dynamic of every trial. While the
witness's job of testifying requires that he produce a coherent
narrative version of relevant events as he knows them, it also insists
structurally that every fact-based assertion he makes be viewed with
suspicion. Whether the attacks are mounted in cross-examination or
by the conflicting testimony of other witnesses, or whether jurors
merely learn from the adversarial pressure of trial process that no
witness account should be accepted unquestioningly, trial process
treats any factual assertion as a possible lie. The dialectical alter-
nation that characterizes procedures such as cross-examination,
44. I 19-20. Not to be outdone, defense counsel assured the jury in their opening that "the
magnitude and importance of the questions here involved cannot be over-estimated, for they go
down to the very foundations of our social, moral and religious life," and concluded by assuring
the jury that the trial "will loom larger in history than any which has taken place for eighteen
centuries" (II 6, 92). Jurors were warned that they would have to answer for their verdict at the
Last Judgment, and that "strangers from distant climes" would one day make pilgrimages to the
courtroom to see the place "from which was given back to the world freed from cloud or passing
shadow, the name of Henry Ward Beecher" (II 1. 92). Though the parties themselves treated
the matter as a grudge match between public men over personal betrayal, the attorneys never
tired of asserting that all of civilization hung fire on the success of their efforts. Much of this
rhetorical grandstanding was obviously aimed at the almost one hundred reporters who attended
court daily, writing up each day's "high points" and turning well-known lawyers into nationally
lionized heroes. Nonetheless, it is a revealing indication of the extraordinary notion participants
had at the time of the case's then-current and imagined historical significance.
45. In using such apocalyptic rhetoric, Morris was obviously delivering a speech to the nation
as well as to the jurors and courtroom spectators who heard his voice in person. Even The New
York Times covered each day's testimony in detail. Media coverage of the case assumed not only
that readers were intensely involved, but that they too were sitting in judgment. The previous
summer, as the church investigation generated national headlines, Godkin declared in The
Nation that the case had been "transferred to a different forum" by the attention of national
media:
This forum consists of the newspapers and their readers, and a more unsatisfactory one,
in some respects, there could hardly be, but it is the one before which a man in Mr.
Beecher's position must plead, sooner or later, to any charge against him.... There is not
a house in the country in which the defendant is not, week after week, put on his trial, and
in every one of them on a different indictment and with different testimony; and the result
he never wholly knows, as the verdict is never wholly formulated and uttered.
E. L. Godkin, "The Trial by Newspaper," The Nation, 30 July 1874, 70. In its posttrial
assessment, Harper's Weekly, like many other papers, adopted the same "nation of jurors"
metaphor when it declared: "The real result is not to be found in the formal verdict of the jury,
but in the general impression, for as the evidence in no cause was more universally read, so the
verdict in every man's breast was never more entirely independent of that of the court-room."
17 July 1875. 574, cited in Carter, 121.
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rebuttal, and final argument dramatically enacts the resistance of trial
process to any party's claim to have a monopoly on truth. Among
recent trial analyses, those of James Boyd White have consistently
celebrated adversarialness for establishing "a culture of argument" in
which "the conversation that it creates is at once its method and its
point, and its object is to give to the world it creates the kind of
intelligibility that results from the simultaneous recognition of contras-
ting positions."'  White's analysis reads the "performed equality" of
trial process as an affirmation of the possibility of multiplicity. What
he ignores is the absolute commitment of that process to continuous,
profound attacks on each position considered separately. Each party
is given a participatory venue in which to speak, but no speaking is
achieved except under siege. Where attacks on assertions of fact are
missing, because there are no fundamental factual conflicts, the case
will be decided on a motion for summary judgment, obviating the
need for trial.47 The survival of a case to trial means that jurors
must negotiate a battlefield of testimony and argument in which, at
the same time that all narrators claim to be truth-speakers, all are, to
a greater or lesser degree, attacked as hypocritical "fictionalizers." In
rendering a verdict for one party, the fact finder delegitimates at least
part of the other party's version (and perhaps parts of all versions) as
constructed falsehood.
If every trial thus enacts a contest between conflicting but purpor-
tedly truthful narratives, the Beecher-Tilton trial was a performance
of mind-numbing length that had a single subject: credibility.
Importantly, the case turned not just on credibility in general but on
one component of credibility: testimonial honesty. Consider for a
moment other kinds of legal claims and offers of proof. In bank
fraud or antitrust cases, the facts may be only minimally in dispute.
Such cases are established primarily through reams of corporate or
financial documents and records, and the large majority of witnesses
may simply identify and interpret documents. The validity or
implications of such interpretations may then be challenged by the
46. James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions
of Language, Character, and Community (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), 267.
47. Under modem rules of civil procedure, either party can obtain summary judgment if
"there is no genuine issue ... as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For a history of the gradual adoption of
summary judgment procedures, see Charles E. Clark and Charles U. Samenow, "The Summary
Judgment," Yale Law Journal 38 (1929): 444-56. The intense factual disputes that characterized
the Beecher case would have precluded summary judgment, of course, even if it had been
available in New York in 1875. To say that there are no conflicts "as to any material fact" does
not mean, however, that there is nothing to argue about. Where both parties stipulate to a set
of facts, they may nevertheless engage in intense and protracted disputes about how those facts
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opposing party without the question of the witness's testimonial
credibility arising. Typically, the outcome in such cases most often
depends on the establishment of such complex law-fact hybrids as the
existence of an unfair restraint of trade, whose proof may depend
substantially on statistical evidence and statutory interpretation. Even
in criminal cases that turn on eyewitness identification, testimonial
honesty may be virtually irrelevant. Where a witness claims to have
seen the defendant commit the crime, the witness's perceptual
credibility-her ability to see, or hear, or remember the details of the
event under the particular circumstances-may be very much at issue,
while her sincerity, her honest belief in what she is saying, may remain
unquestioned. Her identification of the defendant as the person who
robbed her may be attacked on the ground that it was too dark to see
clearly or that the incident occurred so long ago that her memory of
it must have faded, but, with rare exceptions, such challenges do not
amount to a suggestion that the witness is intentionally constructing
a false fiction.' Similarly, where a criminal defendant such as John
Hinckley raises a defense of insanity, both sides may agree on or even
stipulate to the "facts of the case." The verdict then turns on the
jury's assessment of the opposing conclusions of expert psychiatric
witnesses on the single issue of the defendant's mental capacity.
Although experts may bitterly disagree, and although their criteria,
methods, and deductions may be challenged, it is rare indeed for such
a witness to be accused of lying or testifying insincerely."
48. This argument does not mean to ignore the often profoundly blurred line between
misperception and bias. The unreliability of eyewitness testimony is notorious, and has been for
more than a century. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-43 (1967). The "suggestibility"
that troubled the Supreme Court in suspect lineup situations applies to other areas as well. It
includes not only witness unreliability, but juror difficulty in assessing the credibility of
eyewitness testimony. Many studies have shown that a witness's sincere recollection can be
significantly affected by the "unconscious transference" of memories that pre-existed the event
and by post-event suggestions. See Gary L. Wells and Elizabeth Loftus, eds., Eyewitness
Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), 1-11; Paul
Ekman. Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage (New York:
Norton, 1985), 162. These unreliabilities have led to the adoption of various safeguards,
including expert testimony intended to sensitize the jury to factors that affect memory and
perception. For discussion of this trend, see Elaine D. Ingulli, "Trial by Jury: Reflections on
Witness Credibility, Expert Testimony and Recantation," Valparaiso Law Review 20 (1986):
145-85; "Symposium: The Ethics of Expert Testimony," Law and Human Behavior 10 (1986).
Nevertheless, it is still possible to distinguish between the inherent unreliability of individual
perception and the construction of intentionally false testimony.
49. The line between "sincerity" and bias can be a fine one. Without intentionally falsifying
their characterizations of data or their conclusions, expert witnesses are often influenced by their
own ideological, political, and personal agendas. On this topic, see Barton L. Ingraham, "The
Ethics of Testimony: Conflicting Views on the Role of the Criminologist as Expert Witness," in
Expert Witnesses: Criminologists in the Courtroom, ed. Patrick Anderson and L. Thomas Winfree
(New York: SUNY Press, 1987), 178-99; and "Symposium: The Ethics of Expert Testimony,"
Law and Human Behavior 10 (1986). As Gordon Bermant has noted, experts "do not
knowingly speak falsely," but debates about the propriety of expert testimony may "camouflage
arguments about the strength of psychological knowledge" and the scientific certainty of such
19951
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In the Beecher case, however, it was clear from the outset that if
one party's witnesses were telling the truth, then his opponent's
witnesses must be lying, at least about the central disputed facts.
"Does not our view exclude his view?" demanded William Maxwell
Evarts in his closing argument for Beecher. "Does not our view
convict him of wilful, purposed contrivance of evidence against the
truth to beguile your judgment and mislead your verdict?"5 ° It is
important to remember that even the most flagrantly hypocritical
witnesses tell the truth most of the time, because the bulk of their
testimony is about secondary matters, background details, and
undisputed events. In the Beecher-Tilton case, both parties agreed
that Elizabeth Tilton and Henry Ward Beecher had a longstanding,
intimate relationship; they disagreed only about whether that
relationship had included consummated sexual intimacy. Un-
surprisingly, there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged adultery.
Instead, 111 circumstantial witnesses recounted and disputed the
existence and significance of various conversations, documents, and
tangential events. The area of disagreement was thus small but
crucial, and it turned as much on matters of interpretation, on what
certain epistolary or conversational phrases meant, as on the actual
occurrence or non-occurrence of events. Beecher and Tilton each
testified, and each supplied meanings for contested documents.
Ultimately, the jury's task was to decide whether such testimonial
declarations were credible truth or self-serving hypocrisy.
Theodore Tilton testified that in July 1870 his wife tearfully
confessed to him that she had had an affair with Beecher for over a
year.52 Beecher had gradually overcome her resistance, Tilton tes-
expert testimony. Gordon Bermant, "Two Conjectures about the Issue of Expert Testimony,"
Law and Human Behavior 10 (1986): 97-100.
50. III 691.
51. For a provocative discussion of the increasing use of circumstantial evidence in the
nineteenth century, and its relation to the rise of the realist novel, see Alexander Welsh, Strong
Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press, 1992).
52. I 396. One crux of the trial's credibility problems was that Elizabeth Tilton's continual
out-of-court assertions and denials of guilt led to "such a bewildering series of recantations that
in the end nothing she said was fully believed." Rugoff, America's Gilded Age, 204. Because
Mrs. Tilton could not testify, her role in the relationship had to be constructed indirectly,
through letters and conversations; such texts were not merely ambiguous, they were directly
inconsistent. Within one twenty-four hour period, she wrote a "confession" of adultery which
her husband showed to Beecher, a "revocation" of those accusations when Beecher visited her
where she lay in bed recovering from a miscarriage, and a retraction of the revocation when her
husband came home and found out about the letter she had given to Beecher. Waller, 125-26;
Shaplen, 86-98. On the seventy-seventh day of the trial, she attempted to read a statement
declaring her innocence, but was peremptorily silenced by the trial judge (III 323, 325). Three
years after the trial, she published a letter unequivocally admitting the affair. Shaplen, 266;
Waller, 145. Learning of her statement when he was traveling in Germany, Mark Twain wrote
wearily to William Dean Howells: "[W]hen they tell me that Mrs. Tilton has confessed & Mr.
B. denied, I say that both of them have done that before, therefore let the worn stub of the
20
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tified, by convincing her that where two people loved each other,
sexual union was wholly pure and not a violation of her marriage
vow.53 Tilton's friend Frank Moulton and Moulton's very respec-
table wife Emma both testified to numerous conversations with
Beecher in which the adultery was explicitly discussed and regretted,
and in which Beecher sought help in hiding it from his congregation,
his family, and the public.54 Letters by Beecher were introduced in
which he seemed to confess to having committed a great wrong
against the Tiltons, asking Theodore Tilton's forgiveness and declaring
"I humble myself before him as I do before my God."55  Yet
because the letters never explicitly mentioned adultery and employed
an ambiguous and emotional vocabulary throughout, their meaning
became a matter of intense dispute. Though Beecher's memory
consistently failed him on the stand, causing him to answer "I don't
know" or "I don't remember" to hundreds of questions, he did testify
clearly that no adultery had ever occurred and that he had never
made improper proposals to Elizabeth Tilton.56 Beecher testified
that Tilton told him of Elizabeth's "inordinate affection for [him], or
her exceeding affection."57 To the jury, Beecher's attorneys argued
that she had conceived so intense a passion for him that she may have
believed it returned.58 The only wrongs he admitted against the
Tiltons were having unfortunately been the means of Theodore's
losing the editorship of The Independent and having counseled
Elizabeth to separate from a spouse who was mistreating her.59
Beecher's testimony cast Tilton as an adulterous and abusive husband
whose selfish egotism had led to an intense jealousy of the older and
more prominent Beecher and a determination to destroy him.
Beecher was followed on the witness stand by a long parade of
witnesses to his good public character, service, and reputation.6°
This condensation of the case into a testimonial credibility contest ul-
timately paralyzed the jury. Their foreman attributed the deadlock
to a "question of the veracity of witnesses." In dismissing the jury,
Plymouth white-wash brush be brought out once more, & let the faithful spit on their hands and
get to work regardless of me .. " Mark Twain to William Dean Howells, 4 May 1878, Selected
Mark Twain-Howells Letters 1872-1910, ed. Frederick Anderson, William Gibson, and Henry
Nash Smith (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), 109.
53. I 396-97.
54. See l 62-65, 75-89, 104, 129-30 for the testimony of Frank Moulton. and 1 719-54 for that
of Emma Moulton.
55. I 401, II 778-80, 793-94.
56. II 758, 765. See generally II 729 to III 136.
57. II 761.
58. II 48-49; III 661-62, 746, 808.
59. II 770-72.
60. 11 137 to III 556.
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the judge described their sole problem as "the weight of testimony
and the credibility of certain witnesses.,
61
Significantly, the trial's central credibility questions were presented
to the jury as a series of problems in textual interpretation, whether
the texts at issue were the hundreds of ambiguous or vague letters
and documents whose disputed meaning became central to the case,
or the conflicting narrative versions of past events offered by opposing
witnesses. Indeed, the fundamental ambiguity of language became an
explicit and central issue at trial. As Beecher's attorneys declared in
their opening statement to the jury: "Everything here turns upon a
single question. When these people were talking about generalities,
when Mr. Beecher was using general language that might cover one
thing or cover another thing ... to what were the parties referring,
what did they have in their minds?"' Confronted with a plethora
of ambiguous and conflicting narratives, jurors had to decide what
criteria to use in getting from text to inference, from oral or written
declaration to the "mind's" truth. Mere textual persuasiveness, like
mere character reputation, was increasingly shown to be insufficient.
The iterated onslaught of cross-examination, collateral challenge, and
lawyerly deconstruction in a case that turned on charges not just of
sexual misbehavior, but of hypocritical proclamations of virtue,
encouraged juror-readers to lose confidence in their ability to make
reliable inferences from the circumstantial evidence of everyday life.
The vexed question of Beecher's honesty triggered an unsettling
uncertainty that seemed to infect every assertion of truth or virtue in
every context.
What the Beecher-Tilton trial did, to the obsessive discomfort of
both jurors and American newspaper readers, was to demonstrate that
the dynamic narrativizing moment which is at the heart of all text-
producing activities, from letter writing to explanatory testifying to the
construction of a public persona, is also the precise moment at which
the possibility of falsification and deception enters. The authorial
control necessary to the purposeful transformation of subjective
experience into coherent, communicable testimony can, and in some
senses, must, operate in the service of considerations other than truth.
Clarity, performance, and eloquence always create textual surfaces
haunted by the shadow of misleading hypocrisy. Most distressingly,
from the vantage point of the juror-reader, it is clear that the more
persuasive the textual performance, the more difficult it is to
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consistent and believable even if its connection to the referential
world outside the text has intentionally been severed.63
The Beecher-Tilton trial thus presented a series of related ques-
tions, all of which raise the problem of what we might call "false
fictions," plausible but essentially and intentionally false narratives.
How can we distinguish a sincere witness from one who "performs"
sincerity but is actually lying? How can we ever know what actually
happened between two people in private so that we can distinguish
between truthful testimony and equally "realistic" invention? How
can we tell, in our own lives, whether someone we look up to as a
teacher, preacher, or intimate companion is "really" good and
deserving of respect, or a privately corrupt hypocrite and therefore a
"false prophet" or "sinful spouse"? False fictions may take the form
of a dissembling witness's misleading appearance and behavior, a
believable but deceptive testimony, or the aggressively virtuous public
persona of a privately dissolute man. If the problem of identifying
false fictions was indisputably at the heart of the Beecher-Tilton jury's
task, a deep anxiety about the general difficulty of doing so was
already troubling many Americans long before the Beecher scandal
acted that anxiety out on the forensic stage.
As Karen Halttunen has convincingly argued in Confidence Men
and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America,
1830-1870, "the heart of the sentimental value system was a deep fear
of the hypocrisy that was believed to be poisoning American social
relations."'  The socially successful hypocrite-the con man-
became America's supreme criminal because he could "sever the
connection between inner character and outward appearances by
consciously manipulating the impression he made on others."'65 The
new urbanites, accustomed to a world in which they had shared a
lifetime of experiences or at least a common social, geographic, and
63. Riffaterre argues that the believability, or "truthfulness," of a literary fiction is a textual
effect rather than a function of the relation between text and external world. Michael Riffaterre,
Fictional Truth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1990). This argument seems to me
equally persuasive when applied to courtroom narratives, where the "external world," though
very much at issue, can only be represented through the narratives of testimony, or, on occasion,
the "speaking" narratives of "real" evidence.
64. Karen Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture
in America, 1830-1870 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1982), xvii. As David S. Reynolds notes
approvingly in describing Halttunen's thesis, her work "shows that middle-class Americans,
threatened by the moral rootlessness and rampant theatricality of a society undergoing rapid
urbanization, concocted various social rituals that were meant to shore up self-worth and
promote social cohesiveness." Her argument is especially useful, he concludes, in that "it
manages to place seemingly contradictory elements of antebellum American culture--sincerity
and showmanship, trust and mistrust-in a vibrant dialectical center." David S. Reynolds, review
of Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America, 1830-1870,
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economic background with almost everyone they met, now had no
reliable way to distinguish an offer of newfound friendship from the
opening move in an elaborate con game.' The placelessness
induced by a rapidly changing society made hypocrisy "not merely a
personal sin; it was a social offense that threatened to dissolve the ties
of mutual confidence binding men together. 6 7 Over time, the new-
comer's dilemma was answered by what Halttunen calls "the
sentimental typology of conduct," preached by a wide-ranging series
of "advisers" who encouraged a "cult of sincerity" which asserted first
that "all aspects of manner and appearance were visible outward signs
66. This problem is represented vividly in Horatio Alger's novels, which were meant to serve
as entertaining advice manuals for their readers. In Struggling Upward; or Luke Larkin's Luck
(1890), the hero, Luke, is befriended on the train to Chicago by a pleasant and well-dressed
young man, who proposes that they stay together at a hotel. Struggling Upward; or Luke
Larkin's Luck (1890; New York: Penguin Books, 1985). Luke is delighted to have a
knowledgeable and generous companion, but Alger quickly makes clear that the other's "object
was to gain Luke's entire confidence, and remove any suspicion he might possibly entertain" in
order to swindle him of his money. Ibid., 232. Luke's luck holds, and he is able to reveal the
man as a liar. Ibid., 240-42.
In Ragged Dick (1868), the poor bootblack Dick, newly dressed in fine clothes, shows an out-
of-towner around New York. Horatio Alger, Jr., Ragged Dick and Struggling Upward (1868;
New York: Penguin Books, 1985). Within the space of a few pages, they encounter an "agent
of the Excelsior Copper Mining Company" who promises them a fortune in three years if they
will invest in his stock (26-27), and are targeted by a con man, who claims to have found a wallet
stuffed with money, which he offers to give them for twenty dollars (33-37). When Dick's well-
dressed companion is accused of having stolen a pocketbook, the accuser insists that "you can't
tell by looks .... They're deceitful; villains are generally well dressed" (44). In each incident,
Dick, the experienced urbanite, recognizes the swindle and avoids it. Shortly thereafter, they
meet a newly arrived "countryman" who has just been swindled of fifty dollars by a plausible
con artist (50). As the "miserable youth" bewails his bad luck. Dick has little pity for his
ignorance: "He's a baby," says Dick, contemptuously. "He'd ought to know how to take care
of himself and his money. A feller has to look sharp in this city. or he'll lose his eye-teeth before
he knows it" (51).
67. Halttunen, 34. On the impact of immigration to urban areas on Americans' general
sense of security and "place," see Wiebe, who argues in The Search for Order that the rush to
the cities "brought a constant influx of inexperienced newcomers" whose "sense of belonging"
was disrupted and who shared little more than a "common sense of drift.... Fearful of each
other's competition and ignorant of each other's ways, they lived in mutual suspicion, as
separated into groups of their own kind as they could manage." Robert H. Wiebe. The Search
for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 12-14. While "the full range of
impersonal activities" like bribery, extortion, and the yellow press characterized business,
others preached a segmented morality that divided a man's life into compartments and
judged each part by a separate standard. A gracious warmth in the living room, decent
manners in the street, pious thoughts on Sunday, a formal honesty in dealing with acquain-
tances, and animal cunning before the rest of the world, all passed the bar of justice.
Ibid., 39-40.
On the connection of these new urban immigrants to Beecher and to Plymouth Church, see
Waller, 66-68, who describes Beecher's congregation as made up of young men who had come
to the cities from rural farms and villages where they were "closely tied" to their families and
backgrounds "in a geographic, an economic, and a psychological sense" (68). "How different
was Brooklyn," she continues, "where there were no familiar faces and no inheritance to assure
a secure future. These young men, like Henry Ward Beecher himself, were on their own in the
marketplace" (69). In Beecher's sermons and the social life surrounding the church, these new
New Yorkers found "an explanation and justification for the changes in their lives and attitudes"
(69).
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of inner moral qualities" and, consequently, that the aspiring
antebellum newcomer could move confidently through a new society
by following a set of behavioral prescriptions.' Properly attended
to, the rules would enable him to establish his own social acceptability
and to gauge the sincerity of others. One of the most popular of
these advice books was Henry Ward Beecher's Seven Lectures to
Young Men, first published in 1843.69 These lectures warned of the
"moral deterioration of youth, especially in the new western cities"
and the dangers of gambling, drinking, and urban brothels, while
preaching a gospel of success, in which hard work, attention to one's
appearance and behavior, and inner virtue would bring worldly
success.7" Discussing Seven Lectures, Altina Waller notes: "As the
stable communities of early America were breaking down and forcing
young men to migrate either West or to the cities, many found this a
dangerous journey-both physically and emotionally-and moral
guidebooks became standard reading."'"
Halttunen focuses on antebellum America, a period when the first
generation of young people left their familiar rural worlds for
uncertain opportunities in the cities. Yet the anxiety she identifies
was still very much alive in the 1870s.72 Indeed one of the lessons
of the public hysteria surrounding the Beecher-Tilton trial is that
anxiety about hypocrisy remained intense-or perhaps reemerged-as
the effectiveness of such antebellum solutions as the cult of sincerity
68. Halttunen, 40-55. Halttunen's work draws on a broad range of popular advice manuals,
written by clergymen, teachers, and sentimental writers, including William A. Alcott, Young
Man's Guide (Boston: Lilly, Wait, Colman, and Holden, 1834); Reverend David Magie, The
Springtime of Life; or, Advice to Youth (New York: Robert Carter and Bros.. 1853): Reverend
Rufus W. Clark, Lectures on the Formation of Character, Temptations and Missions of Young
Men (Boston: John P. Jewett and Co., 1853). See also Wailer's extensive bibliography of advice
books. Waller, 248-55.
69. Henry Ward Beecher, Seven Lectures to Young Men, on Various Important Subjects;
Delivered Before the Young Men of Indianapolis, Indiana, During the Winter of 1843-4
(Indianapolis: Thomas B. Cutler, 1844).
70. Clark, 57; Waller, 25.
71. Waller, 25.
72. Indeed, Halttunen's somewhat oversimplified "rise and fall" trajectory is the one aspect
of her thesis that has been critiqued. Both David Grimsted and William R. Leach have noted
that the fears of hypocrisy, and the prescriptive solutions offered to assuage them, both pre-
dated and lasted beyond the years Halttunen assigns. As Leach asks: "If middle-class anxieties
were as intense and troubling as Halttunen claims, how could they have disappeared so quickly?
It seems to me that the tensions between authenticity and charlatanism, the need for individual
expression and the need to make concessions to class and status, were never resolved; they have
continued to mark bourgeois behavior in our own time." William R. Leach, review of
Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America, 1830-1870,
by Karen Halttunen, New England Quarterly 56 (1983): 599-603; Grimstead, 665-66. The rhetoric
surrounding Justice Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings is an obvious modem case in
point. Much of the defensive analysis insisted, as did Beecher's defenders in the 1870s, that the
judge's life of public virtue, his prescriptive obedience to the requirements of public rectitude,
constituted strong evidence that he could not possibly have been a hypocrite hiding a corrupt
private life.
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eroded.73  By 1875, outward appearance, which might once have
been believed to hold the key to inner character, was no longer
accepted as a universally reliable index.74  The possibility of
Beecher's adultery was thus troubling as much for its inconsistency
with his decades-long eminence as for its obvious immorality. If
publicly available evidence of virtue was of no use whatever in
assessing the likelihood of private misbehavior, then one was left with
a dizzying sense of the fallibility of all knowledge and relationships,
especially those one held most dear and upon which one's own
identity most strongly depended.
Halttunen argues that the threat posed by successful hypocrisy is
that it will "dissolve the ties of mutual confidence binding men
together," because people will be unable to rely on the apparent
virtue and sincerity of others. William Mowdesley Best articulated
the same sense of a profound connection between sincerity, con-
fidence, and the functioning of society in the legal context in his
influential 1875 treatise, The Principles of the Law of Evidence. Like
the writers of advice books who premised successful social interaction
on an underlying trust in each other's sincerity, Best argued that the
testimonial machinery of trial process was predicated on an as-
sumption of the importance to society of a well-grounded belief in the
honesty of others. Best introduces the subjects of proof and
testimony by observing: "Mutual confidence between man and man
being indispensable to the acquisition of knowledge, the happiness of
73. Because sentimentality no longer successfully assuaged anxieties about the difficulty of
"reading" the true characters of others, the national "unmasking" of a much beloved and
publicly righteous man like Beecher brought home the extreme difficulty of making reliable
judgments. Support for this theory lies in the trial transcript itself. There, the continual harping
by Beecher's lawyers on the necessary connection between character and conduct, their endless
insistence on the absolute reliability of publicly virtuous behavior, begin to sound like a worried
form of overkill, necessary precisely because the connection at issue could no longer be
unproblematically presumed.
74. See Halttunen, 186-90. In a series of editorials E. L. Godkin wrote on the case in The
Nation, he frequently mocked sentimentality (see, e.g., 3 September 1874); he also insisted that
self-presentation and public "character" were simply not enough to constitute a reliable index
of private virtue. In an August 1874 editorial, for instance, he asked,
Ought we not to take each person's account of his moral condition, and not look too nicely
into the conduct of his life? We do not think we exaggerate when we say that Mr. Beecher
has tried this system fully and faithfully in Brooklyn, and we do not fear to add that the
events of the last three months were not necessary to satisfy people of its failure. It makes
a state of society in which the self-respect of the honest, the manly, and pure-minded is
lowered or destroyed, and in which that of the foul, the unscrupulous, the shallow and
tricky, is raised and strengthened; and in which the good and bad and indifferent, by
'pooling' their character, as the railroad men say, produce a mass of corruption, indecency
and vulgarity which has to be periodically washed away by some such tempest as we are
now witnessing.
E. L. Godkin, The Nation, 20 August 1874, 120. When the "pure-minded" and the "tricky" can
both present a seemingly acceptable "character," moral distinctions can no longer be reliably
made, causing a "mass of corruption" that can only be cleansed by the harsh, overwhelming
scrutiny of a major scandal.
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our race, and indeed to the very existence of society, the great
Creator has planted the springs of truth very deep in the human
breast." The natural impulses to speak and to believe the truth are
sanctioned by both morality and religion, Best declared, for "were we
to lose either our feeling of obligation to tell the truth, or our
disposition to receive as truth whatever is told to us, there would at
once be an end to all science and all knowledge, beyond that which
every man had obtained by his own personal observation and
experience. ... Language would be useless, and we should be but
little removed from the brutes."'7 5
Best's analysis forges crucial links between the honesty of speakers,
the trust of hearers, and the ongoing enterprise of civilization. Like
Halttunen, he sees "mutual confidence" as the precondition for all
positive social interaction, and therefore for all the culture-building
enterprises of a society-government, science, discourse-that require
communication. In Best's scheme, trials reaffirm a culture's belief in
its own system of morality and truth by publicly identifying and
condemning those who violate the culture-constituting "natural
instinct" toward truth. After two years of destabilizing scandal about
Beecher, the nation looked to the trial, with its official rituals of
examination and deliberation, for just such a ritual of reassurance.76
What the nation got can only be deemed a spectacular failure. The
jury's refusal to provide a verdict one way or another stalled the
process at what was intended to be only the midpoint of the drama,
the weary moment when all assertions of truth had been thoroughly
undercut by months of adversarial challenge. Had the trial "worked"
as it was ideally supposed to, it would have climaxed at the moment
of verdict, when a choice was made between warring versions of
events. Either Beecher or Tilton would have been triumphantly
unmasked as a lying "fictionalizer," and the jury's verdict would have
75. Best, 17-18.
76. In a September editorial in The Nation, E. L. Godkin declared that "people do not know
what to believe" and were looking to the trial to settle the vexing questions of the scandal.
Presciently, Godkin predicted that the trial would present "questions of veracity, between three
or four persons whose credit is already greatly shaken, or, in other words, the very kind of
questions on which juries are most likely to disagree .... " E. L. Godkin, The Nation, 24
September 1874, 201. Charles F. Marshall, a pro-Beecher editor who published one of the many
books rushed to press in the interval between the filing of the complaint and the trial's
commencement, declared:
The community is now directly interested in the issue now joined. If these men tell the
truth, then Mr. Beecher should not be allowed to pollute the Christian religion by his
ministrations. If they lie, it would be a general disgrace to permit them to escape
punishment after having for so many months filled the public mind with such poisonous
defilement.... Ten thousand immoral and obscene novels could not have done the harm
which this case has done, in teaching the science of wrong to thousands of quick-witted and
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retroactively labelled one set of narratives "truth" and the other
"fiction." 77 However problematic and unsettling such a jury verdict
might have been to many Americans, it would have provided a
significant moment of formal closure. In the absence of any such
authoritative resolution, however, the very blurriness of the line
between fact and fiction became the only official verdict. The as-
sessments of all private individuals were equal, and equally indeter-
minate. If the nation went into the Beecher trial troubled by its
inability to discriminate sincerity from hypocrisy, it came out with less
certainty than ever.
The dialectic of suspicion that I have described as characterizing
trial process makes the courtroom an ideal setting for an anxiety
about the problem of believable hypocrisy to be climactically enacted.
Worried about being "tricked" by publicly virtuous men like Beecher,
while at the same time unable to find reassurance in the prescriptive
sincerity of sentimentality, Americans may have seen the law's
relentless adversariality as an official, authoritative version of their
own questionings and concerns. Moreover, while armchair "jurors"
might have found their anxieties mirrored in the process of any trial,
this trial was, as I have explained, uniquely about hypocrisy. The
nation's "choice" of the Beecher-Tilton case as a national obsession
becomes, in this light, quite comprehensible. This is not to say that
this case was the only scandal, or the only trial, to focus Americans'
misgivings about the reliability of their neighbors' seemingly moral
outward behavior; this was an era of scandals, of which Beecher's was
only the most nationally publicized." Fascination with the sexual
77. The jury need not agree that the winning side's narrative version is unqualifiedly "true,"
or that the losing party's is "false," nor need they agree with each other about what exactly
happened to give rise to the lawsuit. Jurors may formulate inconsistent factual narratives, they
may reject the insistent binarism of adversariality by formulating a third factual narrative drawn
on facts put forth by both parties, or they may discount large chunks of either side's version, yet
still concur as to which side has the better case overall. Many juries attempt to "split the
difference" by such strategies as awarding the plaintiff the verdict but extremely minimal
damages, or, in criminal cases, by returning a verdict for a lesser included offense. By referring
to the verdict as "triumphantly" labeling narratives truth or fiction, I mean to describe their
formal effect. Ordinarily, jury verdicts are not accompanied by detailed findings of fact, and
each juror's personal "narrative" does not become part of the record. Yet, once the verdict is
returned, it retroactively affects the "truth-value" of all witness and party narratives in any
subsequent discussion of the case, whether in or out of court. The winner's story is no longer
described as "alleged," but as proven, while the loser's story must fight the ineradicable shadow
of rejection.
78. As a decade, the 1870s seemed to major in scandal, especially in New York. In 1873,
"Boss" Tweed was convicted in New York of corruption in public office after a sensational trial.
A few years, earlier, the McFarland-Richardson affair of 1869 combined sex, divorce, and
murder to spectacular effect. When actress Abby McFarland left her alcoholic husband and
obtained an Indiana divorce, her now-former husband shot her lover, Richardson, in the offices
of the New York Tribune. Before Richardson died, Henry Ward Beecher married him to Abby
McFarland, and the resulting scandal was of national scope. The New York Times publicly
doubted "whether a more disgraceful outrage on public morals has ever been committed in this
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misbehavior of famously moral public personages was also hardly
unique to the 1870s; our own recent history has seen a wave of similar
scandal-trials, with the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings providing
perhaps the most obvious parallel.
In pointing to a shared concern with hypocrisy as the link between
the structure, substance, and social context of the Beecher-Tilton trial,
my goal is not just to help explain its extraordinary notoriety, but to
set the stage for an analysis of the strategic use of sentimentality-and
antisentimentality-in the courtroom. Because the "sentimental
synthesis" was originally designed to assuage anxieties about pervasive
hypocrisy, its rhetorical dominance at the Beecher-Tilton trial comes
as no surprise. Yet such a solution could no longer, by the 1870s, be
proffered unproblematically. At the same time that William Maxwell
Evarts was attempting to "solve" the Beecher-Tilton trial's credibility
problem through the strategies of sentimentality, Theodore Tilton's
attorneys were trying, somewhat inconsistently, to challenge sentimen-
tality's assumptions, and, in the world of literary discourse, Mark
Twain and Charles Dudley Warner were attacking the forensic use of
sentimentality with passionate virulence.
III. THE JUROR AS SENTIMENTAL READER: "WHY DO
YOU LOOK AT THE GROWING BEAUTY OF THEIR
FACE AND FORM, AND FEEL SAFE?"
If the structure and substance of the Beecher-Tilton trial were thus
uniquely constituted to play into a well-established cultural anxiety
about the difficulty of distinguishing glib confidence men from
authentic moral paragons, the litigative strategy of the parties reflects
a clear attempt to intensify and to exploit that anxiety to their own
advantages. We have already seen Halttunen's and Best's remarkably
similar assertions that what is at stake in a test of hypocrisy is the
"mutual confidence" that underlies the continuing viability of the
participants' community.
I now want to look at a series of statements made by William
Maxwell Evarts in his eight-day closing argument for Beecher.
Evarts, America's leading trial lawyer, had been Andrew Johnson's
community than is involved in the open scorn of the marriage tie and the total disregard of all
principles of justice, which professed ministers of religion and public writers have managed to
display." Editorial, New York Times, 4 December 1869, quoted in Nelson Manfred Blake, The
Road to Reno: A History of Divorce in the- United States (New York: Macmillan, 1962). That
Beecher had already been connected in the public mind with sexual scandal may have intensified
the interest when his own behavior came under scrutiny only a few years later. In a chapter on
"Violators of the Great Taboo," Rugoff examines the Beecher case as one among a series of
sexual scandals of the day, including the Sickles-Key affair, in which a Congressman murdered
his wife's lover and was acquitted on grounds on temporary insanity, and the Fisk-Stokes affair,
featuring blackmail, corruption, and adultery. Rugoff, America's Gilded Age, 183-229.
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defender at Johnson's impeachment. A former Attorney General and
future Secretary of State and Senator, his rhetorical brilliance was
matched by his seemingly easygoing courtroom manner.79 Like the
sentimental rhetoric used by Samuel Morris in his opening for Tilton,
Evarts's deployment of sentimental strategies is profoundly oriented
toward evoking a specific response from the jury:
Ah, gentlemen, you will find as we go on in this cause, and as
you take it up upon its facts and compare it with known prin-
ciples of human nature and human conduct, you will find at every
stage of this business that the attack is not personal but against
our society, against our civility, against our morality, against our
religion. The attack is not that there are wolves in sheep's
clothing, that vicious men dissemble and that they hide themsel-
ves under the cloak of sanctity to prowl on the society that they
thus impose upon .... it is that the favored, approved, tried, best
results of this social scheme of ours, which includes marriage, and
of this religious faith of ours, which adopts Christianity, is false
to the core; that the saintly man and the apostolic woman are
delivered over to the lower indulgences; and that that being
proved, the scheme itself is discredited and ready to be dis-
solved.8"
Now gentlemen, whenever you establish the proposition that
these breaches of external morality that threaten the very fabric
of society, the central point, the purity of the family, can occur
without preliminary moral degradation and preparation-without
being accompanied by an inflammation of the low desires and the
triumph of the flesh over the spirit-can be practiced with the
maintenance of all the active benevolences and the exhibition of
all the beautiful virtues of life, you have struck a blow not at Mr.
Beecher, not at Mr. Tilton, but at your own wives and your own
daughters.... Why do you look at the growing beauty of their
face and form, and feel safe? ... Why, all the while it may be
going on in all our families, and nobody knows anything about it.
What, shall we then discard all this, shall we believe that these
sins come only by power against which no morality can guard,
that there is no necessary connection between character and
conduct; that these sins do not come from within, but that with
all this purity they may arise?...
79. For a good discussion of Evarts's important role in nineteenth-century American law and
politics, see Brainerd Dyer, The Public Career of William Maxwell Evarts (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1933). Evarts's eloquence during his long career-in court
and out-is collected in three volumes in Sherman Evarts, ed., Arguments and Speeches of
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We shall have to have a Wife Deposit Company, where we can
leave our wives during the day, and we shall have to have some
patent contrivance of paramour-proof alarms by which we can be
called to the rescue when the insidious undermining of this
external virtue (for there is nothing left in the world but external
virtue) begins.81
What is going on beneath the wit, hyperbole, and fear mongering in
these passages? Quite simply, Evarts has made each juror's refusal
to countenance attacks on Henry Ward Beecher a necessary act of
affirmation of the reliability of virtue and value in the juror's own life.
If Beecher's alleged corruption can exist without any hint tainting his
publicly available behavior, if "there is no necessary connection
between character and conduct," then our own judgments, based as
they are on similarly external "evidence," are unreliable, and we may
well be unknowingly surrounded by diabolical confidence men,
adulterous spouses, and corrupt institutions. The only way to solve
the problem, argues Evarts, is to take a stand on the side of the
reliability of outward appearance and to refuse even to investigate
accusations that, if true, would undermine the assumptions that prop
up our own lives. What this argument does is to make the "sentime-
ntal typology of conduct" into a principle of evidentiary evaluation,
encouraging jurors to accept certain kinds of evidence as if they
established a conclusive presumption with respect to character, based
on sentimental logic, while rejecting other evidence outright, not
because it is demonstrably false but because its existence dangerously
threatens the continued viability of the sentimental world view.
Two aspects of this strategy bear closer examination. First, Evarts
shifts the locus of action away from Henry Ward Beecher's alleged
sexual misbehavior and into each juror's consciousness. By the time
Evarts is done, it is the juror's values, loved ones, and principles of
judgment that are being tested by this trial-the juror's security of
mind that hangs precariously on the verdict, not Beecher's. As recent
critics have persuasively articulated, this shift is the essence of the
sentimental process in action: the sentimental text is an "act of
persuasion" that works by forging a deep emotional bond of compas-
sion and identification between the reader and the victim-hero/ine,
what Philip Fisher calls an "experimental extension of the self of the
reader."'  Having stimulated the reader to identify the sufferings of
81. III 664.
82. Fisher, 98. See also, Tompkins, Sentimental Designs, 122-46; Janet Todd, Sensibility: An
Introduction (New York: Methuen, 1986); Suzanne Clark, Sentimental Modernism: Women
Writers and the Revolution of the Word (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1991), 19-41; and
Samuels. The essays collected in Samuels's work capture quite well the current critical debates
about the political effect of sentimental works (subversive and empowering, or an education in
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the orphan, the slave, or the prisoner as her own, the sentimental text
achieves its object by altering the reader's world view, an alteration
that necessarily triggers action in the reader's life.83 During the long
months of testimony, defense attorneys had constructed Beecher as
a man of sorrows, a suffering hero wrongly accused, whose honor,
virtue, and domestic felicity were being miraculously upheld despite
Tilton's diabolical charges. Jurors were continually exhorted to feel
deeply for Beecher, to pity, respect, and admire him.' Simul-
taneously, Beecher's attorneys worked to link him to the jurors
through a target response of intense compassion which would make
them identify Beecher's plight as their own.
The sentimental reader reads to respond, finding in the narrative a
blueprint for understanding and improving her own life. In its own
terms, the success or failure of a sentimental text can be gauged by
the intensity of the response that it elicits; its significant battleground
is always, therefore, the reader's emotional field of operation. This
makes the sentimental strategy splendidly useful to lawyers, for an
empathic bond that leads to consonant action is precisely what final
arguments always aim to construct, particularly when the attorney's
goal is to win sympathy, approval, or forgiveness for his client. By
suggesting that a vote for Beecher would be a vote for their own
wives and daughters, Evarts offered jurors a way to "read" their own
lives as reassuringly consistent narratives. Even more to the point, he
made the verdict-vote for Beecher a hopeful endorsement of their
loved ones' virtue. Siding with Beecher, jurors found a solution to
their pre-existent anxieties, one which would stave off for a while
longer their modernist anguish of isolation, the sense that what is
unseen in others, and even in ourselves, is profoundly, even
dangerously, inaccessible.
passivity?) and a glimpse of the broad cultural canvas in which the sentimental synthesis was
played out (murder trials, educational manifestos, abolitionist rhetoric, etc.).
83. Tompkins sees radical action as a consequence of successful sentimentality, particularly
a religious re-vision which makes its bid for power by "positing the kingdom of heaven on earth
as a world over which women exercise ultimate control." Tompkins, Sensational Designs, 141.
Fisher, however, insists that sentimental texts evoke a sense of powerlessness and helplessness
in readers. Fisher, 98. I see sentimental texts as always crucially pushing towards real-world
response, including the possibility of action in contexts broader than those presented only by
religious and domestic issues. My argument therefore sides more closely with Tompkins's
argument and intends to challenge Fisher's position.
84. Beecher's counsel compared Beecher, explicitly and implicitly, to Jesus (II 92, III 557,
III 651). While they noted the stress on him caused by the scandal, they also took care to
emphasize the outpourings of support he had received, declaring that he was "in this supreme
emergence of his life, girded by millions of faithful hearts and walled to heaven by the unfal-
tering love and confidence of his people" (II 7). Counsel also described happy evenings spent
in the Beecher home during the trial, encouraging the jury to envision the "light and joy" in his
home. where the family was "fused together in one spirit of kindliness and love" (III 562).
[Vol. 7: 1
32
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol7/iss1/2
Korobkin
The process by which this shift is achieved is worth a closer look.
One of sentimental literature's most effective rhetorical maneuvers is
to rupture the narrative flow of events so that the author can make
a direct appeal to the reader's most deeply felt experience, by
reaching aggressively into that private store to make the reader's
personal pain serve as the source of literary response. 5 When
successful, the authorial intervention accomplishes not just a closer
connection, but a reversal of relationship between reader and
character. Typically, the process of reading temporarily extinguishes
the immediacy of the reader's own world of experience and emotion,
transforming the reader into a vicarious "experiencer" of the
character's position and emotions. Here, however, the intervention
makes the reader's own experience the "real" heart of the text-reader
interaction, while the narrated event and characters function as paler,
representational stand-ins for the reader.
The true master of this strategy was, of course, Henry Ward
Beecher's sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe, whose 1852 bestseller Uncle
Tom's Cabin continually makes the reader's deepest emotional
experiences an essential component of the narrative action. Like
Evarts, Stowe interrupts the flow of events in her narrative to
construct new scenes in which the reader and her loved ones become
characters in a narrative parallel to, but separate from, the story. A
typical intervention interrupts the story of the slave Eliza's escape
with her young son:
If it were your Harry, mother, or your Willie, that were going
to be torn from you by a brutal trader, tomorrow morning,-if
you had seen the man, and heard that the papers were signed
and delivered and you had only from twelve o'clock till morning
to make good your escape,-how fast could you walk? How
many miles could you make in those few brief hours, with the
darling at your bosom, the little sleepy head on you
shoulder,-the small soft arms trustingly holding on to your
neck?86
At such moments, what happens is not simply that the reader
identifies with Eliza and enters her world, but that a new story is
constructed that brings the defining conditions of Eliza's predicament
into the reader's world, so that it is the reader's child who must be
saved, the reader's home that must be left behind, the reader's
85. See Robyn R. Warhol, Gendered Interventions: Narrative Discourse in the Victorian
Novel (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1989), which studies this phenomenon in useful
detail.
86. Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin, or Life Among the Lowly (1852; London:
Penguin Classics, 1981), 105 (emphasis added).
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physical endurance that must be tested. If the process of transforming
ourselves into fictional characters increases our empathy for Eliza, it
also recasts our own future lives as open-ended narratives whose
shapes are as yet undetermined. Having linked our life-stories to
Eliza's story, and having triggered an anxiety about the outcome of
our own stories, Stowe exploits the narrative uncertainty she has
created to elicit responsive action from her readers.
Like Stowe, Evarts makes the sufferings of his client crucial
components of the hypothetical horror stories he tells the jurors about
their own lives, stories in which their wives' continuous adulteries can
only be prevented through a "Wife Deposit Company" or a
"paramour-proof alarm." Like Stowe, too, Evarts suggests that it is
how the reader actively responds to the story that will determine
whether or not it will come true. A vote for Beecher extinguishes
one narrative of each juror's future life and constructs another one,
so that a juror's vote becomes an act of defense and self-protection.
An "incorrect" vote makes the juror responsible for Beecher's sins
and for the immorality of modern life. Such a vote becomes an act,
not just of suspicion, but of aggression.
In another moment in Uncle Tom's Cabin, a scene in which a
grieving mother lovingly takes the clothes of her dead son from a
drawer to give to Eliza's ragged son, Stowe interrupts the narrative to
ask, "[O]h! mother that reads this, has there never been in your life
a drawer, or a closet the opening of which has been to you like the
opening of a little grave?"87 That Stowe connects her "client," the
escaping slave Eliza, to her reader through their common experiences
of suffering has often been noted. What has not been sufficiently
noted, however, is how this process reverses the relative roles of
reader and text. Instead of the reader vicariously experiencing Mrs.
Bird's grief for her dead child, it is Mrs. Bird, weeping over the little
shoes and toy horse, who enacts the reader's grief over a similar loss.
The textual narrative, though still significant in itself, becomes the
occasion through which the reader comes to terms with her own
sorrow, and, if the process works, achieves emotional equilibrium by
shifting the locus of action to a third site, where she engages in
compassionate action in the world.' Similarly, for those who
87. Ibid., 154.
88. The enormous difference in response to such passages is, I believe, responsible for the
widely varying judgments of Stowe's "authenticity" and success as a writer. Some readers resent
being "manipulated" by her narrative, but Stowe's assaultive engagement should be recognized
as part of her political strategy. All texts are arguably empty until "made" by reading, but
Stowe's novel, more than most, is quite literally incomplete until an involved reader constructs
its potentialities. As a mother of young children, I should and do read Uncle Tom's Cabin
differently from the unmarried college students to whom I have taught it. This is not a sign of
the text's inadequacy, but of its very particular brand of openness.
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respond to Evarts's appeal, Beecher's ordeal becomes a performative
enactment of each juror's anxieties and an occasion for resolving
them.
The second strand of Evarts's strategy is his reformulation of the
"mutual confidence" paradigm described in W. M. Best's treatise on
evidence, from a two-sided model in which truth tellers and truth
believers cooperate to enable the production of society, into a one-
sided line of cause and effect, in which belief alone is both necessary
and sufficient to do the job. Whether or not one person tells the
truth, it is his interlocutor's obligation to believe him. Best's descrip-
tion of the "natural impulse" toward truth contained two reciprocal
elements: the impulse to tell the truth and the willingness to believe
that what we are told is true. In Best's system, of course, both are
necessary for any mutual confidence to arise. It is precisely because
society is grounded on the near-universality of both truth telling and
truth believing that the punishment of the few liars who appear is no
threat to the rest of the populace. Rather, the litigative quest for
falsehood is reassuring, because the ritual identification and expulsion
of unnaturally false speakers guarantees that those who are left can
be trusted. In Evarts's reformulation, however, the coordinate re-
quirement of the prevalence of truth telling by others has simply been
erased. No suggestion is made that the juridical task includes a tough
analysis of competing testimonies to determine which ones are true
and which ones are false. Indeed, having shifted a civilization-
producing activity away from the community as a whole, where
interactive relationships always include the possibility of legitimate
challenge and question, and into each juror's heart and mind, there
seems to be no need to venture beyond that internal realm. We can
create or destroy Christianity and the security of our home life simply
by believing them into virtuous existence.
Evarts argues implicitly, I suggest, that we must believe in the
honesty of others whether or not they are actually honest because
belief makes civilization possible. A faint threatening whiff of heresy
lurks beneath the rhetorical surface here, insinuating the possibility
that our wives, daughters, and priests are not in fact what we need
them to be, but that the last thing any one of us wants to do is to
confront that possibility. The question of Beecher's possible
hypocrisy thus stands in for the question that cannot be asked about
"our" wives and daughters, and our loud refusal to accept even the
possibility that suspicions against him might be justified forecloses the
threat of hidden corruption closer to home. As a litigative strategy,
this is truly brilliant: it induces jurors to refuse on personal moral
grounds even to consider the evidence against Beecher. It is much
more effective than simply arguing that such evidence is weak or
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unpersuasive (though of course Evarts also did just that, for days at
a time) because, if successful, this strategy wins the case for Beecher
on his reputation alone, obviating the necessity of any close juridical
examination of the months of damaging, if ambiguous, testimony.
The defense employed this strategy from the outset. "What is the
use of an honorable life," asked Benjamin Tracy in his opening
statement for Beecher, "if it is no barrier against false accusation; if
in the face of foul conspiracy, its prayers and labors, generosities and
heroisms are to be counted as worse than nothing-merely the
disguises of a rotten hypocrisy?"'89 Tracy's question is grounded in
a paradoxical logic by which, having insisted on a transparent
continuity between what is seen and what is hidden (Beecher's
parishioners believed in him, he added, because they could look
"through his clear eyes into his transparent soul"'), the assumption
of continuity justifies the erection of an impassable defensive
"barrier" between the two spheres. Because public benevolence
guarantees private virtue, the existence of such virtue in a particular
case must be presumed without investigation and all accusations
rejected as necessarily false.
IV. THE ANTISENTIMENTALIST CRITIQUE AND THE NARRATIVE
INCLUSIVENESS OF TRIALS
If Evarts and Tracy used the strategies of sentimentality to solve
the central problem of Beecher's credibility, they did so at a time and
in a context that subjected such strategies to a widespread critique.
This section looks at two aspects of the antisentimentalist challenge:
Tilton's somewhat ambivalent attack on Beecher's conduct-as-
character defense, and Twain and Warner's all-out attack on the
emotional power of forensic sentimentality in The Gilded Age.
If we return for a moment to Halttunen's thesis about the middle-
class preoccupation with the problem of hypocrisy, we note that it has
two components: it identifies an anxiety about the possibility of being
taken in by hypocritical confidence men, and it traces the develop-
ment and gradual disintegration of a solution, the sentimental
typology of conduct, which held that all forms of dress and behavior
were outward signs of inner character. As the quest for apparent
sincerity produced ever more formalized prescriptions, however, the
artificiality of all such rule-induced behavior became increasingly
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to its dissolution.9 Lionel Trilling's important book Sincerity and
Authenticity traces this problem to the French Revolution's preoc-
cupation with the hypocrisy of old French society, causing an
"obsessive concern with the possible-the all too probable-hypocrisy
of the individual, even of one's own self":
The Revolution brought to its highest intensity the idea of the
public, and established, Dr. Hannah Arendt suggests, an ultimate
antagonism between the unshadowed manifestness of the public
life and the troubled ambiguity of the personal life, the darkness
of man's unknowable heart. What was private and unknown
might be presumed to be subversive of the public good. From
this presumption grew the preoccupation with sincerity, with the
necessity of expressing and guaranteeing it to the
public-sincerity required a rhetoric of avowal, the demonstration
of single-minded innocence through attitude and posture, exactly
the role-playing in which Rousseau had found the essence of
personal, ultimately of social, corruption. 'One cannot,' Andre
Gide has said, 'both be sincere and seem so."
As Americans gradually came to recognize the inherent contradic-
tions in a system of prescriptive sincerity, they often opted for the
reliability of formal social performance, allocating the "darkness of
man's unknowable heart" to a private sphere beyond the ambit of
social investigation. But if many Americans had come, by 1875, to
admire theatricality and social performance, and to accept the idea
that public and private selves might be drastically discontinuous
without being diabolical, they were markedly uneasy about saying so
publicly, and even more uneasy about the possibility that well-known
models of morality like Beecher might be as "modern" in such
matters as their most forward-looking parishioners.93
91. Halttunen, 189.
92. Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), 69-70.
93. On the acceptance of theatricality and other obviously artificial social "performances"
in the decades after the Civil War, see Halttunen, 153-97. The unwillingness to make public
declarations that acknowledged what was actually tolerated in private morality can be seen in
virtually all of the media coverage of the Beecher-Tilton case. In America'sGilded Age, Rugoff
usefully discusses the disparity between actual and rhetorical attitudes toward contraception,
abortion, sexuality, and adultery, noting that during this era, "virtue became increasingly a
matter of appearances." Rugoff, 171. Rugoff documents the widespread availability of
pornography, the significant numbers of "unwed mothers," the houses of assignation where
respectable couples met to commit adultery. Ibid., 171-229.
Yet newspapers and magazines never seemed to tire of describing the "heinous crime" with
which Beecher had been charged, and to insist with righteous indignation that, if guilty, he was
fouler and blacker than any other human on earth. See, for example, Daily Graphic, 17 August
1874, 324: Beecher is charged with "a revolting crime or series of crimes;" Harper's Weekly, 17
July 1875, 574, opined that the possibility that Beecher is guilty is "so violent and improbable
that it involves an almost unprecedented moral monstrosity, and adds deeper blackness to the
possibility of human guilt.. . . If guilty his conduct throughout shows a depravity so exceptional
as to sequester him from the human race." Ironically, the plainest speaking man of the era may
1995]
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The complex attitudes toward sentimental rhetoric displayed at the
Beecher trial demonstrate that such culturally defining concepts do
not follow straightforward rise-and-fall trajectories, but circulate
among groups over time, fading and returning in response to changing
circumstances. Thus, while sentimental typology was under broad
cultural attack both outside and inside the courtroom, it nevertheless
retained real power for large segments of the population. It
dominated the trial rhetoric of both sides in their appeals to the jury,
even while the same counsel eagerly mocked the sentimental language
of certain letters and documents. And, on occasion, counsel adopted
strikingly inconsistent approaches to the use of sentimental strategies.
This ambivalence was most obvious in the strategically unfortunate
vacillation of Theodore Tilton's attorneys. While attempting at times
to challenge the logic of Beecher's conduct-as-character defense, at
other moments they accepted its assumptions wholesale and tried, by
offering negative rather than positive examples of his public conduct,
to elicit an inference of private immorality. Thus William Beach, in
his closing for Tilton, read statements from Beecher's sermons
reflecting religious unorthodoxy on issues such as the doctrines of
atonement and the divinity of Christ,' quoted Beecher as having
accepted the evolutionist arguments of Darwin, and suggested to the
jury that, though evidence of other sexual misbehavior could not be
legally introduced, "you shouldn't assume that he had been a man
entirely relieved from any suspicions of a like or previous offense."95
Carrying the presumed connection between external and internal to
its logical conclusion, Beach even argued that Beecher's plump body
and full lips betrayed his licentiousness. The preacher "has never
been conspicuous for self-denial and asceticism" in matters of eating,
drinking and other "pleasures of the senses," he observed. Then,
"reading" Beecher's body as the authentic, unfalsifiable register of an
undisciplined sensuality, he announced that "every lineament of his
features declares him to possess those appetites in a marked
degree."'96
well have been Beecher himself. When rumors that Grover Cleveland had fathered an
illegitimate child threatened to destroy his 1884 campaign for the presidency, Beecher declared:
"If every man in New York State to-night, who has broken the seventh commandment, voted
for Cleveland, he would be elected by 200,000 majority." New York Times, 8 November 1884,
cited in Hibben, 307. While Hibben considers Beecher's speeches in support of Cleveland
tantamount to a confession of his own transgression, Clark sees them as an assertion that his




96. III 844. For a similar forensic reading of the licentious body of one accused of a similar
sexual offense, see Ed Cohen, "Typing Wilde: Construing the 'Desire to Appear to Be a Person
Inclined to the Commission of the Gravest of All Offenses,"' Yale Journal of Law & the
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Attempting to use the logic of Beecher's own forensic strategy
against him, Tilton's attorneys argued that vulnerabilities in the
preacher's "public" persona could be read as manifestations of private
corruption. At the same time, however, they tried to erode the
underlying power of the trope of "character." Beach asked whether,
considering ... the rather erratic and extravagant career of Mr.
Beecher as a teacher, looking at the tendencies of his thought
and sentiments as delineated in his spoken words, considering the
impulses of his nature, as we read them through his utterances,
is he deserving of the high encomiums he has received .... and
is he by the simple authority of his character and his word to
overturn the power of demonstrative proof?"'
Note how, by stripping Beecher's "character" of its presumptive
association with affirmative teachings, thoughts, and sentiments, the
word "character" itself becomes emptied of clear, easily available
meaning. By the time the word appears, near the end of the
sentence, it has become problematic, a consequence that effectively
precludes its talismanic saving power from working to Beecher's
benefit. Instead of murky arguments about "character," Beach
suggests, he will offer the real goods, unambiguous and persuasive
"demonstrative proof."
Beach also attempted a direct attack on character theory itself, an
attack premised on the clash between the sentimental, unitary view of
character and a modernist conception that assumed profound
discontinuities. For Lionel Trilling, the awareness of the "ambiguity
of the personal life, the darkness of man's unknowable heart,"
becomes the springboard into the modernist conception of the self.
It divides modern man's often alienated self-consciousness from what
now seems to have been a naive faith in appearances and in the easy
availability of meanings. In an attempt to elicit skepticism about the
inferential usefulness of evidence about Beecher's public conduct,
Beach offered the Trilling-like assertion that "we cannot see the
Humanities 5 (1993), 1-49. Cohen analyzes the way that the media coverage of Oscar Wilde's
"sodomy" trial contrasted Wilde's "feminized," "soft," and "grotesque" body with the Marquis
of Queensbury's stalwart masculine appearance and "implacable" gaze, a contrast that "came
both to personify the structures of difference through which the newspapers articulated their
narratives and to represent the differences in question as the negation of middle-class male
norms." Ibid., 18, 15-20. Beach's "reading" of Beecher's body, like the newspaper's charac-
terization of Wilde's, intended to prove that the preacher's "abnormal" sexuality was visible,
inherent, and transparent. It also aimed, by presenting "undeniable" physical evidence of
licentiousness, to demonstrate to jurors that Beecher was different than they were, outside the
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heart."98 At the same time, however, he did not want to erode the
effectiveness of his own "character" arguments, or to offend the sen-
sibilities of more traditional jurors. He was forward-looking, but
tentative: "we cannot search the secret recesses of human nature," he
declared.
We but see the superficial character in the public acts of men...
but yet they give us no clear and satisfactory clue to the true
inwardness of a man.. . . We cannot well say of a man, even one
with whom we are personally acquainted, however estimable may
be all his characteristics and associations, and apparent acts-we
cannot after all say to him or of him, that he is a faultless human
being.'
Beach's argument, while it stresses the discontinuity between "public
acts" and "the secret recesses of human nature," nevertheless frames
the problem as one of inaccurate perception rather than of humanity's
terrifying potential for evil. It suggests that a morally unambiguous
"character" exists, though we may have trouble discerning it, and it
retains the sentimental vocabulary-the term "true inwardness"-to
refer to that inner self. Indeed, his conclusion that a publicly virtuous
man may not, after all, be "faultless" suggests that he is attempting to
reassure and even to protect his listeners from the really disturbing
implications of his argument. Though forensic rhetoric often adopts
somewhat contradictory strategies, Beach's closing argument seems to
be at war with itself in ways that blunt its effectiveness. Unwilling to
propose a consistent conception of character, either sentimental or
realist, Beach tried to offer both at once. The mixture of genres sent
thoroughly mixed signals, a literary conflict which may well have
undercut his narrative persuasiveness.
The distrust of professed sincerity displayed by Beach is directed at
the problem of evaluating individual "character," the difficulty of
making reliable inferences about the "inner" person from available
data about his "outer" behavior. When the critical focus shifts from
sentimentality's role in constructing individual character to its forensic
function in linking lawyers to jurors, sentimental trial rhetoric looks
dangerously manipulative, marked by the "role-playing" and "social
corruption" that, according to Trilling, Rousseau deplored.1"
At the same time that Evarts, Morris, and company were putting
their faith in sentimentality's capacity to forge powerful emotional
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of sentimentality's power to elicit action based on "feeling" rather
than "reason," particularly when that power was exerted in juridical
contexts. The antisentimentalist critique is perhaps best represented
by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner's 1873 novel, The Gilded
Age, which climaxes in a devastating indictment of the dangers of
forensic sentimentality, here deployed by defense counsel in an
emotional murder trial. The novel was written, as Justin Kaplan has
noted, "at a time when every day brought news of some revelation in
the Beecher affair.'' Writing two years before the Beecher
scandal's culminating trial, Twain and Warner seemed presciently to
understand that the rhetoric of sentimentality was already profoundly
on trial in America. t" 2 By situating their critique of sentimentality
at the crux of lawyer-jury interaction in a capital case, they treat the
sentimental mode not as one among many ways of narrating a story's
events, but as a dangerous narrative instrument of manipulation, a
powerful forensic tool. A brief discussion of the novel will illustrate
the widespread fear among Americans that the juridical use of
sentimentality posed a profound threat to justice, law, and society.
The Gilded Age did more than provide an American era with a
name tag: it images American culture as a giddy series of interlocking
get-rich-quick schemes, ruled by a pervasive corruption and hypocrisy.
The novel satirically demolishes the sentimental synthesis, insisting
again and again that the essence of appearance is its manipulability,
not its transparency. When the warm glow of a stove is revealed to
be the light of a single candle, for instance, the novel's hero, Colonel
Sellars, assures his freezing guest that "what you want is the ap-
pearance of heat, not the heat itself.""0 3 The plot dances through
101. Justin Kaplan, "Introduction," in The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today (Seattle: Univ. of
Washington Press, 1968), xiv-xv. Kaplan also links The Gilded Age to the Credit Mobilier
scandal, while French's book-length study of the novel persuasively reads it as a parody of the
1872 San Francisco murder trial of Laura Fair. Bryant Morey French, Mark Twain and the
Gilded Age (Dallas: Southern Methodist Univ. Press. 1965), 96-116. It is also true, however, that
Warner and Twain were friends of Beecher. Beecher had written the introduction to Warner's
My Summer in a Garden, and both were members of the Nook Farm circle in Hartford, a group
which also included Beecher's sisters Harriet Beecher Stowe and Isabella Beecher Hooker. In
Nook Farm: Mark Twain's Hartford Circle, Kenneth R. Andrews asserts that "nothing else in
the years between 1870 and 1875 loomed so large in Nook Farm's experience as the disaster
befalling Henry Ward Beecher," and describes in detail the involvement of Twain and Warner
in the unfolding scandal and the trial. Kenneth R. Andrews, Nook Farm: Mark Twain's
Hartford Circle (Seattle: Washington Univ. Press, 1969) 35, 33-41. It is quite likely, therefore,
that the unfolding scandal was very much on their minds as they co-wrote the novel at
breakneck speed.
102. Though he does not analyze the novel, Paul Carter also notes its parallels to the
Beecher-Tilton case, commenting briefly that "the real people in Tilton v. Beecher talked like
the fictitious people involved in the Laura trial in Volume II of The Gilded Age, published two
years earlier. Perhaps it was another case of life imitating art." Carter, 116.
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myriad hypocrisies; among them is the quasi-tragic story of Laura
Hawkins, a beautiful orphan whose innocent childhood ends abruptly
when she is seduced and abandoned by a Confederate officer. When
her former lover appears years later, she follows him to New York
and shoots him.
Twain and Warner present the climactic murder trial as a storytell-
ing contest between Evarts-like lawyers for control of the jurors'
melting hearts. The prosecutor, calling Laura a "fiend in the form of
a beautiful woman," reminds the jurors in his opening statement that
they are "citizens, husbands, perhaps fathers."'" Using Stowe's and
Evarts's technique of narrative interruption, Twain and Warner
construct a hypothetical horror story about the jurors' own lives,
which only their verdict can preclude: "They knew how insecure life
had become in the metropolis. Tomorrow their own wives might be
widows, their own children orphans, like the bereaved family in
yonder hotel, deprived of husband and father by the hand of some
murderous female."' 5 The rhetoric of the Hawkins trial, like that
of the Beecher-Tilton trial, is frequently more concerned with
stimulating the juror's self-interested emotions than with presenting
the "facts" of the case.
The challenge for Laura's attorney is to wrest the role of sym-
pathetic juror-allied victim away from the dead man's family and onto
Laura herself. Attorney Braham begins by flattering the jurors as
"men with hearts to feel for the wrongs of which she was the
victim."" 6 He describes Laura's life:
the sport of fate and circumstances, hurried along through
shifting storm and sun, bright with trusting innocence and anon
black with heartless villainy, a career which moves on in love and
desertion and anguish, always hovered over by the dark spectre
of INSANITY,-an insanity hereditary and induced by mental
torture. 07
He then unfolds a sentimental formulation of her life story, from her
rescue as a "sweet little girl found among the panic stricken survivors"
of a steamboat wreck, to the moment when the villain Selby "plucked
the sweetest bud ... and having enjoyed its odor, trampled it in the
mire beneath his feet.""l  Spectators collapsed in tears, but Mr.
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trial's end, he closes with a rousing peroration, demanding for "a
deluded woman rendered irrational by the most cruel wrongs.. . that
justice which you and I shall need in that last dreadful hour, when
death will be robbed of half its terrors if we can reflect that we have
never wronged a human being."'10 When the prosecutor makes the
fatal mistake of delivering a rational closing argument, "convincing
the reason without touching the feelings," the defense inevitably
triumphs."' Laura is acquitted by reason of temporary insanity.
The novel has frequently been interpreted as an attack on abusive
insanity pleas, on sentimental literature, and on the general incom-
petence of juries, whose "melting hearts" and "perfectly macaronian
bowels of compassion" Twain had frequently ridiculed."2 What has
not been adequately noticed is the degree to which Twain's critique
turns on the intersection of law, narrative, and sentimentality. The
attack is not only that jurors are stupid, but that they display the
attributes of emotional receptivity-the melting heart and easy
compassion-which, minus the sneer, constitute the ideal sentimental
reader. In the narrative of events before the trial, Twain presents the
murder as the act of an unequivocally sane but immoral woman.
1 3
Yet at the trial, Laura's lawyer successfully suppresses the jurors'
capacity for rational deliberation and judgment by drawing them into
a story of suffering, exploitation, and madness. Serious criminal trials
are precisely the places where the need for detached, unimpassioned
reasoning is greatest, the novel suggests, yet the sentimental tango
110. Ibid., 392.
111. Ibid.
112. On the connection between The Gilded Age and Twain's attitudes toward juries and
insanity pleas, see French, 96-116. For a reading of the novel as an attack on sentimental
literature, see Susan K. Harris, "Four Ways to Inscribe a Mackerel: Mark Twain and Laura
Hawkins," Studies in the Novel 21 (1989): 138-53. Twain's words are taken from a 10 March
1873 letter to the editor of the New York Tribune describing the "ideal criminal juror." Cited
in French, 100.
113. Twain's confidence that his text demonstrates the outrageousness of the "temporary
insanity" plea may be seriously misplaced. The satirical treatment of the Hawkins verdict, and
Twain's well-known disdain for such pleas make it clear that he expected readers to agree that
Laura's was an act of premeditated murder, committed by a wholly sane, morally corrupt woman
who should be held responsible both for the murder and for her sexual "fall." This conclusion
is undercut, however, by the earlier sections of the book, which construct Laura as an
assemblage of sentimental topoi-a sympathetic character abused, betrayed, and irremediably
damaged by her seducer. At bottom, the pretrial narrative of her life and lawyer Braham's
sentimental formulation are not very different. Many sympathetic modem readers will
reasonably connect Laura's position as sexual victim to her later loss of control and resort to
violence, since Twain never accords her an inner life or an autonomous "rational" decision-
making independence. A more serious attack on the gendered insanity defense would have
required imaging Laura outside the stereotypes of female irrationality that produced the defense
in the first place. See, in this connection, Edward Berenson's The Trial of Madame Caillaux
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. California Press, 1992), which connects legal concepts of
insanity at the turn of the twentieth century to the gendered, stereotypical literary and scientific
discourses of the day about women and sexuality.
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danced between coldly manipulative lawyer and overemotional juror
vitiates, in the authors' eyes, the trial's status as a quest for truth or
justice. In Twain and Warner's text, Laura Hawkins's acquittal poses
an overwhelming danger to ordered society as constituted through
law, precisely because sentimental storytelling works just as effectively
in the jury box as in the novel-reader's living room.
Indeed, sentimentality is a great deal more dangerous in the
courtroom than the home, the novel implies, because so much more
is at stake: not only the fate of accused criminals, but the legitimacy
of the law's judicial process for dealing with crime and disorder.
Ultimately, sentimentality challenges the "mutual confidence" among
men that Best's treatise identified as so necessary to a functioning,
"civilized" society. Twain and Warner's "modern" antisentimentalism
insists that cold reason is a better tool than warm responsiveness for
evaluating the "truth" of witnesses and their stories. The emotional
involvement, the personal stake in the story that Stowe and Evarts
work so hard to construct in their readers and listeners, is exactly
what Twain and Warner find so inimical to justice. To demonstrate
the dangers of such manipulability, they play with the novel's
denouement, providing first a "fictional" image of Laura shut away in
a horrifying hospital for the criminally insane; then, abruptly inter-
vening in the narrative, substituting a "true history" of her complete
post-trial release from confinement; and, finally, concluding with an
abrupt authorial "murder" when she dies quite suddenly of "heart
disease."'1 4 Readers who resent being emotionally manipulated by
this narrative sleight of hand should, the novel implies, rethink the
consequences of such vulnerability in legal contexts, where the
fascinating storyteller may be defending a very real criminal rather
than a fictional heroine.
EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AS MODERNIST NARRATIVE
The jury at Laura Hawkins's trial had to decide between conflicting
narratives of her life, actions, and mental state. The events and
characters in each party's story were virtually the same, but the
unambiguous moral valence and interpretive characterization given to
each were in direct opposition, as they were at the Beecher-Tilton
trial. At all trials, of course, the need to make each party's story
demonstrate an entitlement to prevail creates a pressure that leads to
the elimination of gray areas, compromising details and moral
ambiguities. Constructed, therefore, on a principle of exclusion,
litigation narratives tend to reproduce sentimental paradigms of victim
114. Twain & Warner, 402-03, 422-23.
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and perpetrator, plots and characters whose dynamics depend on the
absolute avoidance of any moral ambiguity."'
Trial process as a whole, however, can never enact the unidimen-
sional morality of sentimental fiction or melodrama, because it
encompasses not only the necessarily opposing narratives of both
parties, but the testimony of witnesses who often refuse to follow
their lawyer-directed scripts, and the nonparty commentary of the trial
judge. Thus, if each party's narrative is constructed on a principle of
exclusion, the trial as a whole operates on a principle of inclusion, of
multiple causation and ambiguity. Its adversarial structure fore-
grounds gaps, shadings, and inconsistencies-inviting constant attack,
correction, and addition-and it provides at least two plausible
versions of the centrally contested facts. In literary terms, complete
trial transcripts therefore always pull toward realism and modernism,
genres often defined by their insistence on all forms of
complexity-moral, motivational, and formal. The trial's structural
embrace of multiplicity makes it difficult for either party to remain
untarnished; even a verdict in one party's favor at the trial's end
cannot wholly erase the shadows thrown on the victor's story by the
insistent adversariality of the process.
The tension between the moral binarism of sentimentality and the
chiaroscuro produced by trial process can be strategically useful in
planning a forensic offense. An opponent who constructs himself, as
Beecher did, as a moral paragon and purely sympathetic victim, risks
losing his affirmative image in one swoop if his claim to fit the heroic
stereotype is persuasively undercut. Sentimental fiction disintegrates
whenever extenuating circumstances muddy the moral field on which
its pure victims and fiendish oppressors must perform. A sympathetic
sentimental character, unlike a sympathetic realist character, cannot
be victim and perpetrator simultaneously. 6 Without challenging
115. By referring to the unambiguous moral field in which sentimental fiction is explicitly
enacted, I do not mean to deny the power of such fictions to subvert, implicitly, their surface
simplicity. Like the sensationalist fictions of the 1860s, sentimental novels often subtly invite
different alliances than those explicitly claimed by the text. In particular, they offered female
readers images of sexual and social empowerment, however necessary it may have been to
"punish" such independence by the novel's end. For discussions of this complexity, see Nina
Baym, Woman's Fiction: A Guide to Novels By and About Women in America, 1820-1870
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978); Lynn Pykett, The "Improper" Feminine: The Women's
Sensational Novel and the New Woman Writing (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), and
Tompkins's work.
116. The distinction highlighted here can best be understood in the context of criminal
behavior. Sentimental villains-Stowe's Simon Legree, Dickens's Murdstone, Bill Sykes, or
Wackford Squeers-though they may have sketchy, unloved childhoods, are not permitted to
become genuinely sympathetic, or to be seen as less than responsible for their own evil. Realist
fiction, however, has as a central trope the protagonist who is both murderer and victim, from
Clyde Griffiths in An American Tragedy, to Bigger Thomas in Native Son, to Joe Christmas in
Light in August. Theodore Dreiser, An American Tragedy (New York: Modern Library, 1953);
19951
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the basic fact that his opponent has suffered wrongs, a litigant can
move that opponent out of the hero's role by showing that he has
inflicted sufferings on others, or even that much of his pain indirectly
results from his own misdeeds. Once jurors are detached from a
stance of uncritical compassionate identification with the opponent,
the way is open for a recasting of events and the presentation of a
new narrative.
In a recent article, Wai Chee Dimock distinguishes the defining
characteristics of the criminal law from those of the nineteenth-
century novel by opposing the "frugality" of the former with the
"luxury of signification" of the latter. Her analysis counterpoints the
increasingly narrow legal definitions of crimes and the circumscription
of allowable punishments with the "symbolic latitude" available in
fiction, where appropriate rewards and punishments can be distributed
outside confining legal contexts and forms."7 Applied to fiction, the
thesis works well; indeed, The Gilded Age is a perfect example, as the
sudden death of Laura Hawkins from "heart disease" metes out the
harsh but appropriate retributive justice denied by Twain and
Warner's jury of captive fools, empowering the fictive universe to
achieve what criminal process in the real world cannot.
Considered in relation to the Beecher trial, however, Dimock's
categories become problematic. In Dimock's analysis, law as a system
is inherently exclusive, or narrowing, while the narrative products of
authorial imagination are expansive, continually locating new
meanings and ethical possibilities. Yet at the Beecher trial, which can
be taken as a paradigm of mid-Victorian American legal process, the
narratives under individual authorial control were markedly "frugal"
in their ambit of signification, however infinite they may have been
in absolute word count. They were unambiguous, single strains culled
from multiple possibilities. But the trial process as a whole, including
myriad "frugal" narratives, generated a complete transcript that
displays many of the characteristics that Dimock identifies only with
the expansive possibilities of fiction, and specifically with the realist
Richard Wright, Native Son (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1940); William
Faulkner, Light in August (New York: Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, 1937). These novels
invite us to see criminal behavior in a larger context of racial, class, and cultural oppression,
forcing us to rethink such notions as moral judgments of "character," individual responsibility,
and free will. Both Dreiser and Wright use climactic trials to contrast the morally ambiguous
world created by the novel's narrative with the criminal law's reductive drive to fix all blame on
a single stereotypically "evil" defendant. Their fictional trials can in turn be contrasted to an
actual trial like the Beecher-Tilton trial, at which the drive for a single "answer" became
diffused into multiple and competing versions of events and interpretations of documents, until
the possibility of fixing the "blame" definitively was thoroughly undercut.
117. Wai Chee Dimock, "Criminal Law, Female Virtue, and the Rise of Liberalism," Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities 4 (1992): 223-24.
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novel. As an inclusive "modern" novel, the trial transcript undercuts
factual and moral certainty; surrounds each party's narrative with
alternative meanings, doubts, and possibilities; and frequently
interrupts the textual flow of witness narrative to permit a variety of
attacks. Indeed, to follow the analogy a step further, the transcript of
this particular trial is arguably more postmodern than realistic in its
refusal to provide a verdict, to close factual gaps, or to suggest the
existence of an unambiguous "reality" outside the multiple and
conflicting verbal representations of witnesses and lawyers. By
shifting our vantage point from a consideration of individual party
narratives to a reading of the six-month trial as a single text, we are
forced to rethink the literary genres through which the narratives
work and to construct a new and quite different textual subject.
This expanded vantage point is perhaps best represented by the
national news media, whose response to the trial's inconclusive
resolution provides a fitting conclusion to my argument. The day
after the trial ended, The New York Times published a lengthy
analysis of the evidence, later published separately as a pamphlet.
The Beecher-Tilton jurors may have failed to provide the closure of
a unanimous verdict, but the newspaper displayed no hesitation in
filling the gap. It delivered an unequivocal judgment, finding the facts
strongly against Beecher, and expressing a clear belief in his guilt.
Yet although convinced of Beecher's guilt, the Times refused to assert
Tilton's innocence, rejecting almost wholesale the details of his self-
serving narrative. Admitting that "it is a mournful sight to see a great
preacher of religion resting even under the suspicion of a dark crime,"
the Times editors declared themselves unable to "feel pity or respect"
for Theodore Tilton. "That Tilton should have known of his wife's
guilt; that he should have gone on living with her; that he should even
have consulted with her alleged seducer as to the paternity of one of
her children, and that, finally, he should declare on this very trial that
she is a 'pure, white-souled woman'-all this puts him a long way
outside of the range of public sympathy.""'  The newspaper's
conclusion demonstrates the ultimate inability of either party to
circumscribe the narrative possibilities available to juror-readers. The
very exclusivity of each side's narrative, when juxtaposed with his
opponent's, will tend to suggest the possibility of a third narrative (or
of multiple thirds) made up of some of each, and even, on occasion,
of conclusions propounded by neither party. The Times saved its
severest criticism, for instance, for Elizabeth Tilton, whom both
Beecher and Tilton, for different reasons, had insisted was pure,
118. The Beecher Trial: A Review of the Evidence, 33.
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innocent, loving, and "whole-souled." Although not a word of direct
criticism of Elizabeth had been uttered at the trial, the Times
dismissed her as "degraded and worthless," declaring that "a city full
of such women would not be worth the trouble and misery which this
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